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Personal Health Information Shared Via Social Networking 
the problem until information is inappropriately disclosed results in 
little opportunity for a meaningful remedy. 
Federal regulations would protect the value placed on control of 
PHI by attaching protection to the information itself. It is more 
realistic to place restrictions on what can be done with acquired 
information than to attempt detailed regulation of this rapidly 
evolving industry.209 While users should also participate in the 
protection of their personal information through use of the privacy 
settings afforded, deceptive privacy advertisement and obtuse privacy 
policies should not render this participation meaningless. 
Preemptively establishing a set of federal regulations as a benchmark 
for addressing these kinds of issues before they arise will help mitigate 
the harms that are otherwise sure to follow. Federal regulations 
requiring meaningful privacy disclosures and truthful advertising, 
establishing guidelines for use of PHI, and providing causes of action 
with precedential value would keep pace with reality of the evolution 
of online social networking. 
Federal regulations protecting PHI would fill the gap in the 
current law, provide meaningful dispute resolution options and 
remedies, and delineate concrete expectations for all participants. 
The permanence of information posted online heightens the need for 
this sort of protection. 210 It is all too likely that information posted 
will become a permanent part of an individual's "digital" persona 
without the mercy of short human memory.211 Such a framework will 
have broad applicability as more and more interactions move toward 
online exchanges. 
209. See supra Part IV.A. 
210. See supra Part III.B. 
211. Abril, supra note 19, at 75 (discussing how "the digital record has 
increased ·the stakes of privacy today ... "). 
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HIT LOSERS: THE GOOD (FAITH) 
FIGHT FOR NET-PROFITS PAYMENTS 
FROM BLOCKBUSTER HOLLYWOOD 
PRODUCTIONS 
Max Bialystock: You were saying that, under the right 
circumstances, a producer could make more money with a flop 
than he could with a hit. 
Leo Bloom: Yes. It's quite possible. 
Max Bialystock: You keep saying that, but you don't say how! 
Leo Bloom: Well, it's simply a matter of creative accounting. 1 
Gould: I think conservatively, you and me, we build ourselves 
in to split, ten percent. (Pause.) 
Fox: Of the net. 
Gould: Char. Charlie: Permit me to tell you: two things I've 
learned, twenty-five years in the entertainment industry. 
Fox: What? 
Gould: The two things which are always true. 
Fox: One: 
Gould: The first one is: there is no net. 
Fox: Yeah ... ? (Pause.) 
Gould: And I forgot the second one. 2 . 
Neal Robin3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contracts for services on an entertainment project contain many 
of the same provisions as those found in any commercial venture. 
These contracts include provisions describing the nature of services to 
be performed and the compensation to be provided in exchange for 
those services during the course of the agreement. Sought-after 
Hollywood actors, directors, and producers are able to secure 
additional concessions from the studios that hope to gain their 
1. MEL BROOKS & TOM MEEHAN, THE PRODUCERS: How WE DID IT 91-92 
(2001). 
2. DAVID MAMET, SPEED THE PLOW 33 (1988). 
3. J.D. Candidate, 2013, Case Western Reserve Univ. School of Law; 
Northwestern University School of Law, Law Student, 2012-13; B.A, 
2007, Emory University, with departmental distinction in History. I 
would like to thank the attorneys whom I interviewed for their guidance 
in preparing this Note, as well as their clients, for giving me something 
to write about. And I would like to thank my family-especially my 
mother-for funding my education and Ashley Hartman for her patience 
and support. 
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participation on the project. For these individuals, the standard 
contract between Hollywood studios4 and creative talent5 provides 
compensation in addition to a salary in the form of "net profits. "6 If 
the entertainment project takes in more revenue than it costs to 
produce-after all necessary deductions are made from its budget-
the creative talent will ·collect a percentage of the net profits as set 
out in their services agreement. 7 
But most films and television series are not financial successes,8 
leaving creative talent to collect only their salaries and move on to 
the next project. Back-end compensation, while an important feature 
of an ~greement for creative talent, is not always the highest priority. 
However, a limited number of projects surpass the studio's most 
optimistic expectations and become major blockbusters at the box 
office or in the Nielsen ratings. When it becomes apparent that a 
project will generate enough revenue to contemplate net-profits 
compensation, creative talent will often insist on remuneration. The 
process then becomes tricky, as studios resist making net-profits 
payments on the assertion that the project did not earn enough 
money according to their calculations. 
In the entertainment industry, the major studios calculate and 
report a project's financial condition using esoteric accounting 
practices that differ from those used outside Hollywood.9 These 
calculations frequently reach the conclusion that the film or television 
series earned zero profits for those promised compensation contingent 
on the project's financial success.10 Creative talent-who are, in this 
4. The term "Hollywood studio" and its iterations refer to Warner 
Brothers, Sony Entertainment Group, Walt Disney Pictures, Twentieth 
Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Paramount Pictures, as well as to 
boutique production houses such as Lionsgate, The Weinstein Company, 
MGM, CBS Films, and Summit. 
5. The term "creative talent" refers to the actors, directors, writers, and 
producers whose talents are displayed to audiences in motion pictures 
and television shows. 
6. See EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, THE HOLLYWOOD ECONOMIST: THE HIDDEN 
FINANCIAL REALITY BEHIND THE MOVIE INDUSTRY 69 (2010) (explaining 
the different forms of compensation in Hollywood). 
7. See infra Part II (detailing the complications involving net profits and 
compensation). 
8. SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE BASIC BUSINESS, LEGAL AND 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY 13 (4th ed. 2011) (estimating 
that eighty percent of motion pictures produced by Hollywood studios 
lose money). 
9. . See infra Part II(A)(l). See also, Steven D. Sills & Ivan L. Axelrod, 
Profit Participation in the Motion Picture Industry, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
1989, at 31 (explaining the concept of gross receipts). 
10. See infra Part II 
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circumstance, called profit participants11-learn that they will receive 
diminished or no contingent compensation for a film that earns 
hundreds of millions of dollars at the box office or commands tens of 
millions of TV viewers for each new episode.12 Even though attorneys 
and talent representatives lower the creative talent's expectations for 
contingent compensation at the outset, they nonetheless complain 
that the project has been so profitable that it cannot possibly have 
failed to earn enough money to distribute net-profits payments.13 
Critics of Hollywood studios deride this method of accounting, calling 
it "Hollywood accounting. "14 
This phenomenon has a long tradition in Hollywood. For 
example, the film Batman15 earned more than $250 million at the box 
office16 and was one of the top ten grossing films of all time when 
released in 1989.17 Nevertheless, Warner Brothers, the studio that 
produced the film, reported a loss of $36 million. 18 Thus, no payment 
of net profits was made to profit participants. 19 When the executive 
producers of the film challenged their participation-accounting 
11. "Profit participant" is a term used to refer to recipients of net profits, 
particularly creative talent and investors in motion pictures and 
television series. See, e.g., Sills & Axelrod, supra note 8 (classifying 
profit participants as "producers, directors, writers and actors"). 
12. See, e.g., COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount 1988), earning roughly $250 
million in worldwide box office but showing a loss of $17 million (cited 
in Hillary Bibicoff, Net Profit Participations in the Motion Picture 
Industry. 11 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 23 (1991). See also Celador Int'l, 
Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (profit 
participant disputes that his 50-percent share of profits amounted to 
zero dollars according to the studio's calculation). 
13. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86. 
14. See, e.g., Mike Krasnick, 'Hollywood Accounting' Losing in the Courts, 
TECHDIRT (Jul. 8, 2010, 10:07 AM) http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20100708/02510310122.shtml (attaching a balance sheet 
enumerating costs and expenses of a blockbuster motion picture 
production, including multimillion-dollar 'fees' the studio charges the 
production to compensate itself). 
15. BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989). 
16. "Box office" is the total amount of .money the moviegoers spent on 
ticket sales at the theaters. 
17. Dennis McDougal, A Blockbuster Deficit: 'Batman' Accounts Show a 
$25.8-Million Deficit for the Warners Hit That Grossed $253.4 Million; 
the Film may Never Show Profit, L.A. TIMES (March 21, 1991), 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-21/entertainment/ca-
796_1_net-profit (detailing the profits and costs associated with making 
the movie). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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participation on the project. For these individuals, the standard 
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compensation in addition to a salary in the form of "net profits. "6 If 
the entertainment project takes in more revenue than it costs to 
produce-after all necessary deductions are made from its budget-
the creative talent will ·collect a percentage of the net profits as set 
out in their services agreement. 7 
But most films and television series are not financial successes, 8 
leaving creative talent to collect only their salaries and move on to 
the next project. Back-end compensation, while an important feature 
of an 0greement for creative talent, is not always the highest priority. 
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office or in the Nielsen ratings. When it becomes apparent that a 
project will generate enough revenue to contemplate net-profits 
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payments on the assertion that the project did not earn enough 
money according to their calculations. 
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1989, at 31 (explaining the concept of gross receipts). 
10. See infra Part II 
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circumstance, called profit participants11-learn that they will receive 
diminished or no contingent compensation for a film that earns 
hundreds of millions of dollars at the box office or commands tens of 
millions of TV viewers for each new episode.12 Even though attorneys 
and talent representatives lower the creative talent's expectations for 
contingent compensation at the outset, they nonetheless complain 
that the project has been so profitable that it cannot possibly have 
failed to earn enough money to distribute net-profits payments.13 
Critics of Hollywood studios deride this method of accounting, calling 
it "Hollywood accounting. "14 
This phenomenon has a long tradition in Hollywood. For 
example, the film Batman15 earned more than $250 million at the box 
office16 and was one of the top ten grossing films of all time when 
released in 1989.17 Nevertheless, Warner Brothers, the studio that 
produced the film, reported a loss of $36 million.18 Thus, no payment 
of net profits was made to profit participants. 19 When the executive 
producers of the film challenged their participation-accounting 
11. "Profit participant" is a term used to refer to recipients of net profits, 
particularly creative talent and investors in motion pictures and 
television series. See, e.g., Sills & Axelrod, supra note 8 (classifying 
profit participants as "producers, directors, writers and actors"). 
12. See, e.g., COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount 1988), earning roughly $250 
million in worldwide box office but showing a loss of $17 million (cited 
in Hillary Bibicoff, Net Profit Participations in the Motion Picture 
Industry. 11 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 23 (1991). See also Celador Int'l, 
Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (profit 
participant disputes that his 50-percent share of profits amounted to 
zero dollars according to the studio's calculation). 
13. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86. 
14. See, e.g., Mike Krasnick, 'Hollywood Accounting' Losing in the Courts, 
TECHDIRT (Jul. 8, 2010, 10:07 AM) http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20100708/02510310122.shtml (attaching a balance sheet 
enumerating costs and expenses of a blockbuster motion picture 
production, including multimillion-dollar 'fees' the studio charges the 
production to compensate itself). 
15. BATMAN (Warner Bros. 1989). 
16. "Box office" is the total amount of .money the moviegoers spent on 
ticket sales at the theaters. 
17. Dennis McDougal, A Blockbuster Deficit: 'Batman' Accounts Show a 
$25.8-Million Deficit for the Warners Hit That Grossed $253.4 Million; 
the Film may Never Show Profit, L.A. TIMES (March 21, 1991), 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-21/entertainment/ca-
796_1_net-profit (detailing the profits and costs associated with making 
the movie). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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statements, the court found in favor of the studio, rendering the 
producers unable to recover additional compensation.20 
Profit participants have to surmount significant legal hurdles to 
recover the share of net profits they expected to earn in connection 
with their contracts. The studio-talent relationship is unique in that 
it carries duties in addition to those found in ordinary contracts. 
Studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute net profits 
on behalf of profit participants.21 Participants themselves play no role 
in the collection-and-distribution efforts. 22 Thus they are beholden to 
studios to calculate their payments completely and properly. In 
addition, participants accuse studios of harnessing their superior 
bargaining position to play games with a project's financial 
statements to the participants' detriment. 23 
In its defense, the studios dispute this characterization of their 
behavior. They insist that the studio-:participant relationship is 
merely a contract for services for which no additional duties are owed 
beyond those the contract sets forth. 24 They assert that participants 
know precisely how their compensation is measured, since it is 
outlined in agreements their representatives negotiated and they 
themselves signed.25 Studios contend that, in filing suit, a participant 
is attempting to unwind a contract carrying unfavorable 
consequences, which is not a proper judicial function. In defense of 
this position are courts themselves, which have recognized and 
supported the studio's view in high-profile cases.26 
Disputes surrounding net-profits payments carry high stakes. 
Owners of entertainment projects that achieved commercial and 
popular success often wish to capitalize on their popularity. They do 
20. Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC 
051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994) (finding for the studio because the claim 
for unfair competition was dependent on finding that "net profits" 
contract was unconscionable). 
21. See infra Part II(A)(l) (explaining the process of gross receipts). 
22; See id. ·see also Stanton L. Stein & Marcia J. Harris, Vertically 
Challenged, L.A. LAW., May 2003, at 30. 
23. See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 106 Cal. App.4th 25, 28 (2003) 
(participant contending the studio used it's exclusive control over 
project financials to his detriment). 
24. See infra note 105 (explaining fiduciary relationships in contracts). 
25. David Edward Agnew, Profits of Doom: Net Profit Participation 
Contracts in the Motion Picture Industry, 15 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 
367, 375 (1991) (explaining the process of making contracts in the 
television business) 
26. See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Ct., 106 Cal. App. 4th 25 (2003) (holding the 
right to contingent compensation does not alone suffice to create a 
fiduciary relationship). 
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so by licensing the intellectual property associated with the 
production in several media-including broadcast syndication, 
merchandise rights, theme-park attractions, and online distribution.27 
Profit participants stand to earn considerable sums from these 
revenue streams, but only a handful of them have the patience and 
pocketbooks necessary to support the expense of strenuous legal 
battles against sophisticated and deep-pocketed studios. 28 As of late, 
a growing number of agreements for creative talent contain provisions 
mandating arbitration to resolve disputes surrounding payments of 
net profits. 29 
Despite long odds, California judges and juries have recently 
rendered favorable decisions for profit participants, in each case 
finding that the studio took deliberate steps to dodge payment of net 
profits.30 The courts in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.31 
and Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Company32 
ordered studios to pay multimillion-dollar judgments because they 
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
undermining the participant's expectation of receiving net-profit 
compensation for their work on a successful project. 33 But in other 
cases California courts have found for the studio, rejecting good-faith 
claims by participants where the studio entered into promotional 
agreements with third parties for which the studio (and thus the 
participant) did not earn monetary compensation.34 Such narrow but 
momentous rulings may spur creative talent to review financial 
statements with heightened meticulousness and challenge those 
containing suspicious numbers. In addition, recent court decisions 
will likely push studios to reexamine how they calculate and report on 
a project's profitability.35 
27. See, e.g., Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal. 
App.4th 1107 (2008). 
28. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 203 (explaining that litigation is expensive 
and should be avoided). 
29. Ted Johnson, Arbitration Clauses Irk Creatives, VARIETY (Oct. 28, 
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118045188 
(discussing how arbitration clauses are presented in the industry). 
30. See Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal.App.4th 1298 
(2010); Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F.Supp.2d 846 
(C.D.Cal. 2004). 
31. Ladd, 184 Cal.App.4th 1298. 
32. Celador, 347 F.Supp.2d 846. 
33. See Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1308-12; Celador, 347 F.Supp 2d at 852-
53. 
34. See infra Part .III(C) (providing examples of relevant case law). 
35. See infra Part IV (discussing the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing). 
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The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it examines how 
profit-participation agreements are structured. Second, it explains 
court decisions where these agreements were challenged on the bases 
of either breach of fiduciary duty or the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. Section II explains the term "net profits" and 
describes factors influencing a participant's ability to earn such 
compensation. Section III analyzes how participants, at least initially, 
failed to persuade courts that the right of contingent compensation 
gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. It goes on to describe how 
courts have been backing away from this position; indeed, courts have 
demonstrated willingness for fiduciary-duty claims to proceed beyond 
the pleading stage. Section IV discusses decisions where courts found 
violations of the implied covenant in profit-participation agreements. 
This Note concludes by suggesting a legal theory of contingent 
compensation that may inform parties as they decide whether to have 
a legal forum resolve their disputes. It suggests that a contractual 
right of contingent compensation should include an implied right of 
reasonable access to financial information and an accounting of 
revenues that is reasonably accurate under the circumstances. It also 
asserts that creative talent will struggle to convince a court that a 
studio impliedly owes talent fiduciary duties on the basis of a 
contractual right of contingent compensation-unless talent 
demonstrates that the studio-talent relationship is legally cognizable 
as fiduciary. Such a finding requires more than a contractual right of 
contingent compensation. 
II. NET PROFITS 
"When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean." -
Humpty Dumpty36 
A. Nothing But Net: An Overview of Net Profits and Hollywood 
Accounting 
"Net profits" refers broadly to the wealth an entertainment 
project has accumulated after specified expenses are deducted from its 
budget.37 As a term defined in an agreement, net profits contains no 
fixed meaning as a matter of law; instead, its meaning depends on 
36. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLASS 106 (2011) (cited in Schuyler Moore, Do You Know 
Your Showbiz Terms?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jul. 1, 2010, 10:36 
AM), http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/2010/07 /do-you-know-your-
showbiz-deal-terms.html (stating that a word should be used in its true 
meaning, although it often has other meanings in the entertainment 
industry). 
37. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 7 (providing a definition of net profits). 
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what the parties bargained for in each agreement.38 Generally the 
term provides for the deduction of a project's gross receipts-the total 
amount of revenue a project has generated-and certain expenses 
incurred in the course of production.39 These expenses are also 
defined in the contract, but are typically called "production costs," 
"distribution fees," and "distribution ·expenses."40 But the baseline 
measure from which contingent compensation will be calculated can 
also vary by agreement. For instance, it is not uncommon for 
contingent compensation to be based on a project's "adjusted gross 
receipts," "gross receipts after break-even," and the like.41 
Since these defined terms contain many of the same words and 
sound similar to each other, it is not uncornrnon for profit participants 
to misunderstand which revenue streams are included in calculations 
of net profits. And when profit participants complain that the 
participation statement contains inaccurate or incomplete payments 
of contingent compensation, the meaning of net profits becomes a 
kind of Rorschach test for opposing parties to dispute. Put simply, 
participants want a high figure reported while studios want to report 
a low figure. 42 
Participants complain that the definition of net profits is poorly 
written and a nightmare to decipher once the amount is ·a source of 
dispute.43 Since the term lacks clarity, it invites studios to play 
games with the numbers; thus, studios can pay any amount of 
contingent compensation while maintaining fidelity to the formula set 
forth in the agreement.44 As such, every lawyer who negotiates his 
client's participation agreement should fully understand how the 
payment is measured.45 Calculating back-end compensation should 
therefore be a matter of straightforward arithmetic. Disputes 
38. See, e.g., Roman Silberfeld and Bernice Conn, The Red and the Black, 
L.A. LAW., May 2011, at 39 (explaining that several contractual 
definitions are used to explain net profits, including but not limited to, 
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contingent compensation," and "contingent bonus."). Although there is 
no "standard net profit participation agreement," the contracts of major 
studios contain similar terms and formulae. 
39. See id. 
40. MOORE, supra note 7, at 9 (providing definitions) 
41. Id. at 149. 
42. See id. 
43. See Tim Connors, Beleaguered Accounting: Should the Film Industry 
Abandon its Net Profits Formula? 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1997) 
(explaining the current net profits formula). 
44. See id. 
45. Id. 
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The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it examines how 
profit-participation agreements are structured. Second, it explains 
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36. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLASS 106 (2011) (cited in Schuyler Moore, Do You Know 
Your Showbiz Terms?, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jul. 1, 2010, 10:36 
AM), http://reporter.blogs.com/thresq/2010/07 /do-you-know-your-
showbiz-deal-terms.html (stating that a word should be used in its true 
meaning, although it often has other meanings in the entertainment 
industry). 
37. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 7 (providing a definition of net profits). 
450 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Hit Losers 
what the parties bargained for in each agreement.38 Generally the 
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surrounding the appropriate measure of contingent compensation have 
prompted a great amount of litigation. 46 
1. Gross Receipts: How Studios Minimize the Amount of Contingent 
Compensation Owed to Participants 
For Hollywood studios, any given film or television series counts 
only as one of many investment projects. According to Schuyler 
Moore, a prominent Hollywood attorney, a studio's financial interests 
dictate the formula used to calculate a project's financial condition, 
rather than a desire for a precise snapshot of its finances. 47 For 
instance, for purposes of gross receipts, studios want to accelerate the 
payment of expenses and delay the reporting of payments as long as 
possible because the time value of money makes the total cash 
available to make distributions less valuable.48 
Until Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.,49 studios 
minimized the amount of gross receipts generated by a project by 
allocating income away fro;m hit films to those that were not financial 
successes through a practice known as "straight lining. nso Licensing 
fees derived from packaging a slate of films to license to cable 
companies for broadcast is a source of studio income. 51 Revenues 
earned from the licensing package have to be allocated to the films 
that formed the package. For purposes of illustration only, the 
blockbuster film Titanic52 might be included in the same package as 
the film John Carter, 53 a prominent box-office disappointment. 
Despite the disparity in success, the studios, given their proximity to 
financial information, have the opportunity to allocate a 
46. See, e.g., Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 706083, 1992 WL 
1462910, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992 ("In the second phase of the trial 
the court decided, inter alia, that certain provisions of Paramount's net 
profit formula were unconscionable."); Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner 
Bros., Inc., Nos. BC 051653 and BC 051654 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1994) 
(explaining that plaintiff failed to show contract's net profits provision 
was unconscionable); Complaint, Estate of Garrison v. Warner Bros., 
Inc., CIV. CV 95-8328 RMT, 1996 WL 407849 (G.D. Cal. June 25, 
1996) (settling for an undisclosed sum); see also, Alperson v. Mirisch 
Co., Inc., 250 Cal. App.2d 84, 90-91 (1967) (discussing the difference 
between gross and net profit participations). 
47. MOORE, supra note 7, at 149 (introducing the various methods studios 
use to calculate project financials). 
48. Id. 
49. 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010). 
50. See infra Part IV.C. 
51. See infra Part IV.C 
52. TITANIC (Twentieth Century Fox 1997). 
53. JOHN CARTER (Disney 2012). 
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disproportionate amount of the licensing fee to the flops to minimize 
the amount calculated for purposes of net-profits payments owed to 
participants in successful films. 54 
Tactics similar to straight lining arise in the context of calculating 
revenues earned from the sale of home videos and DVDs. As Moore 
notes, the industry practice is to include twenty percent of gross 
receipts from such sales for purposes of paying profit participants. 55 A 
participant is entitled to a fraction of those earnings as the basis for 
calculating his payment of net profits.56 The major studios tap 
affiliates to sell DVDs to wholesalers or retailers, and the studio will 
then likely use the remaining funds to pay the expenses of 
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the DVDs and keeps the 
profits.57 For purposes of illustration, if a film earns $100 from the 
sale of home videos, a participant entitled to five percent of net 
profits earns five percent of $20, not five percent of $100, reducing the 
prospect of contingent compensation. 
2. Distribution Fee: How Studios Further Minimize the Amount of 
Contingent Compensation Owed to Participants 
The standard contract contains language allowing the studio to 
deduct the cost of production.58 For a film production, a studio does 
not incur expenses for use of its facilities, but will nevertheless assign 
costs for using the sound stages, equipment, etc. that is greatly in 
excess of the actual costs. 59 
Practices that are more controversial include charging fees that 
bear no reasonable relation to the actual costs incurred and erroneous 
calculations that place productions in the red when they should be in 
the black. For instance, in a suit filed against Warner Brothers, the 
film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. claimed the studio assigned costs to the 
54. See infra Part III.B. 
55. MOORE, supra note 7, at 151. 
56. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 36 ("Vertically integrated 
media conglomerates own most of the entities involved in the 
production, distribution, and merchandising of properties, so it is not 
difficult for them to manipulate the accountings to ensure that no 
contingent compensation ever will be shared with profit participants"). 
58. Joseph F. Hart & Philip J. Hacker, Less than Zero, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
1996, at 34, 38 ("The [Standard Profit Definition] contains language 
that permits the studio to deduct the cost of production, determined in 
the customary manner producer accounts for production cost at the 
time the picture is produced."). 
59. See id. 
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disproportionate amount of the licensing fee to the flops to minimize 
the amount calculated for purposes of net-profits payments owed to 
participants in successful films. 54 
Tactics similar to straight lining arise in the context of calculating 
revenues earned from the sale of home videos and DVDs. As Moore 
notes, the industry practice is to include twenty percent of gross 
receipts from such sales for purposes of paying profit participants. 55 A 
participant is entitled to a fraction of those earnings as the basis for 
calculating his payment of net profits.56 The major studios tap 
affiliates to sell DVDs to wholesalers or retailers, and the studio will 
then likely use the remaining funds to pay the expenses of 
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the DVDs and keeps the 
profits.57 For purposes of illustration, if a film earns $100 from the 
sale of home videos, a participant entitled to five percent of net 
profits earns five percent of $20, not five percent of $100, reducing the 
prospect of contingent compensation. 
2. Distribution Fee: How Studios Further Minimize the Amount of 
Contingent Compensation Owed to Participants 
The standard contract contains language allowing the studio to 
deduct the cost of production.58 For a film production, a studio does 
not incur expenses for use of its facilities, but will nevertheless assign 
costs for using the sound stages, equipment, etc. that is greatly in 
excess of the actual costs.59 
Practices that are more controversial include charging fees that 
bear no reasonable relation to the actual costs incurred and erroneous 
calculations that place productions in the red when they should be in 
the black. For instance, in a suit filed against Warner Brothers, the 
film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. claimed the studio assigned costs to the 
54. See infra Part III.B. 
55. MOORE, supra note 7, at 151. 
56. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 36 ("Vertically integrated 
media conglomerates own most of the entities involved in the 
production, distribution, and merchandising of properties, so it is not 
difficult for them to manipulate the accountings to ensure that no 
contingent compensation ever will be shared with profit participants"). 
58. Joseph F. Hart & Philip J. Hacker, Less than Zero, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
1996, at 34, 38 ("The [Standard Profit Definition] contains language 
that permits the studio to deduct the cost of production, determined in 
the customary manner producer accounts for production cost at the 
time the picture is produced."). 
59. See id. 
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production of the film Blade Runner without explanation.60 Upon 
audit, it was revealed that the studio accounted improperly for the 
negative cost (i.e., the cost of making the movie) of the film by 
charging Ladd the full amount of the production payment ($15.8 
million) instead of his portion of the payment ($7.9 million).61 
B. Roadblocks Encountered by Participants in Obtaining an Accurate 
and Complete Calculation of Contingent Compensation 
Creative talent are highly suspicious of how studios arrive at 
financial conclusions because studios negotiate transactions for 
licensing the intellectual property of the project and allocate net-
profits payments on the basis of revenues collected and calculated 
internally.62 Talent does not have the bargaining power to negotiate 
changes of any material provisions of a net-profits formula. 63 
However, it is customary for studios to grant participants a limited 
right to audit the project's books and records. 64 Financial statements 
are delivered to participants on a quarterly or semi-annual basis, 
reporting the project's income statement.65 For participants, 
exercising the right to audit provides an opportunity to cure reporting 
errors on the studio's accounting statements-but they are not 
provided access to every financial record. 66 
Despite having the right to audit, inspecting a project's books and 
records is a time-consuming and costly endeavor. Participants who 
exercise their right to audit wait as long as eighteen months to gain 
access to financial records67 at a cost ranging from $20,000 to 
60. Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc.,., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298, 1301-03 
(2010) (discussing the history of the dispute and Ladd's assertions of 
improper cost assignment). 
61. Combined Respondents' Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 
88, Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010) 
(No. B204015), 2009 WL 899836. 
62. It is worth noting that this arrangement is not unlike a manufacturer-
distributor relationship in any other industry, where A hires B to 
distribute A's product. B distributes the product to X, Y, and Z. A 
then pays B a portion of the proceeds. Or a lessor-lessee relationship 
where a tenant pays his pro-rata share of utilities based on the 
building's total utilities bill. The tenant can audit the landlord's books 
if he bargains for an audit right. 
63. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (discussing how studios employ 
methods to retain nearly all the power in the studio-talent relationship). 
64. MOORE, supra note 7, at 154-55. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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$100,000, depending on the size of the production. 68 The auditor's 
findings serve as the basis of protracted negotiations to correct errors 
or make additional allocations to the participant. Errors that are 
revealed upon audit range from those that are clerical in nature-and 
fixed by the studio without complaint-to those that seem 
intentional.69 Yet an auditor's findings are limited, since participants 
are deprived of complete access to the financial records. 70 As a 
practical matter, representatives of the studio and the participant 
negotiate a settlement for a fraction of what the participant claims to 
be entitled to in connection with his contract. 71 
C. Forms of Hollywood Accounting 
Hollywood accounting practices differ from those generally utilized 
in other commercial industries. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practices (GAAP) govern the procedures of reporting costs and 
revenues in most commercial industries to enable a firm's board of 
directors to hold managers responsive to shareholders for their 
performance.72 Instead of GAAP, the film and television industries 
are supposed to follow the guidelines set forth in the Financial 
Accounting Standards Bulletin 53 (F ASE 53), which encourages 
studios and television networks to use the accrual method of 
accounting in .its productions.73 Under the accrual method of 
68. Telephone Interview with Stanton L. Stein, Partner, Dreier Stein Kahan 
Browne Woods George LLP, Mar. 1, 2012. 
69. Id. 
70. MOORE, supra note 7, at 155 ("[A]uditors are spoon-fed limited books 
and records of the film company (and not of its affiliates). For example, 
auditors are almost never given access to the general ledger or 
underlying contracts that would show unreported income or rebates."). 
71. Stein Interview, supra note 67. 
72. See, e.g., Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 37, at 39 ("For example, in 
[ Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846 (C.D. Cal. 
2004)], an incomplete, two-page exhibit describes 'defined contingent 
compensation' in the contract among Celador, ABC, and Buena Vista 
Television. The description states, in part: 'For purposes of Defined 
Contingent Compensation, Participant agrees that words and phrases 
used in connection with Participant's contingent participation, if any, 
are . . . not intended to correspond to any conventional understanding 
or dictionary definition of such words and terms, whether used in the 
entertainment industry or any other industry or business and are not 
intended to correspond in any way to generally accepted accounting 
principles [GAAP], or any other meanings thereof, which may be 
associated with the practices of accounting or auditing."'). 
73. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 53, FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD. (1981). . 
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accounting, an entity records revenues on its balance sheet when they 
are earned and records expenses when they are incurred.74 
But studios and participants abandon these guidelines regarding 
net-profits payments and instead agree to have the agreement itself 
dictate the method of calculation, often removing the protections 
shareholders enjoy through GAAP and FASB 53.75 Given 
considerable leeway, studios can maintain and report financial 
statements disclosing different sets of numbers to shareholders and 
participants. Attorney Bruce Belenky has explained how a studio can 
minimize its obligation to pay contingent compensation: 
[The studio] may recognize revenue when it is actually received, 
while taking expenses when incurred. [That means that when a 
studio licenses a project to a third party, the studio] may not count 
the license fee as revenue until they actually receive it. Even when 
they receive a non-refundable advance, they might not count it as 
income until the time of the broadcast. Meanwhile, they count 
expenses as soon as they are incurred, even if they have not paid 
them. This mismatching of revenues and expenses allows the [studio] 
to delay payment to participants.76 
D. Vertical Integration 
In the television industry, the consolidation of media companies 
into a small number of vertically integrated companies has enabled 
studios and television networks to produce and broadcast programs 
that they themselves own. 77 After the repeal of the Financial Interest 
and Syndication Rules78 in 1995,79 a studio-such as Walt Disney 
Pictures-could acquire a television network-such as ABC-which in 
turn could acquire a distribution arm-such as Buena Vista 
Television-that designates a production company to produce and 
license a television show for broadcast on networks and later for 
74. Hart & Hacker, supra note 57, at 36. 
75. Id. 
76. Bruce Belenky, Film Studio Accounting Issues, BELENKY LAW (Jan. 19, 
2012), http://belenkylaw.com/2012/01/film-studio-accounting-issues/. 
77. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (describing how vertical 
integration allows conglomerates to control the process of producing and 
distributing media). 
78. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1970) (restricting the number of programs a 
network could own on its prime time television schedule, prohibiting 
networks from syndicating the programs they owned, and preventing 
them from sharing in profits). 
79. See Broad. Serv.; Television Station Ownership, 60 Fed. Reg. 58, 15688 
(Mar. 27, 1995) (allowing television networks to own, produce, 
distribute, and syndicate programs without restriction). 
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syndication to cable companies that share a corporate parent.80 
Vertical integration enabled Disney to control television programs like 
Who Wants to be a Millionaire?31 through subsidiary companies,82 all 
under a previously prohibited ownership structure. 
Critics of vertical integration argue that this ownership model 
allows an integrated company to "dictate the financial terms of 
distribution and syndication because it controls the licensor and 
licensee of the rights in the property. "83 Profit participants complain 
that integrated companies use leverage to structure transactions in a 
manner that delays, diverts, or eliminates payments of contingent 
compensation. 84 Some profit participants have even filed suit against 
studios, alleging that the studio or network did not seek the highest 
possible licensing fee for broadcast rights as it could have obtained if 
affiliated companies did not sit on each side of the bargaining table.85 
E. Rising Costs of Production and Novel Forms of Payment of 
Contingent Compensation Reduce Probability for Net-Profits Participants 
to Collect Payment 
Since most films and television series produced in Hollywood fail 
to earn a positive return on its investment, studios offer the promise 
of contingent compensation so talent can share in a project's financial 
success.86 Moore puts the matter simply: "Most films lose money!"87 
In the television industry, it is customary for a network television 
show-one airing on ABC, NBC, CBS, or FOX-to air 100 original 
80. Id. 
81. Who Wants to Be A Millionaire'? (Valleycrest Prod. 1999). Each of the 
entities identified in this example was an affiliate or subsidiary of The 
Walt Disney Co. when Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? was produced. 
82. See, e.g., Celador Int'l v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that ABC and Buena Vista Television are 
both subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Co. and that these subsidiaries 
control Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?). 
83. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 ("In this way, the parent 
corporation of both the affiliated licensor and licensee can manipulate 
their negotiations tci best serve the corporation's interest."). 
84. Id. at 34-35 (noting that studios have a great deal of leverage of clients 
in the contract negotiation process). 
85. Id. at 32 (listing self-dealing claims brought by profit participants 
against media conglomerates that ultimately settled out of court). 
86. Id. 
87. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 13 (claiming that 803 of movies fail to 
recoup their production and distribution costs); Sills & Axelrod, supra 
note 8, at 31 (estimating the standard studio contract results in profits 
for the participant in less than five percent of all films released). 
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accounting, an entity records revenues on its balance sheet when they 
are earned and records expenses when they are incurred.74 
But studios and participants abandon these guidelines regarding 
net-profits payments and instead agree to have the agreement itself 
dictate the method of calculation, often removing the protections 
shareholders enjoy through GAAP and FASB 53.75 Given 
considerable leeway, studios can maintain and report financial 
statements disclosing different sets of numbers to shareholders and 
participants. Attorney Bruce Belenky has explained how a studio can 
minimize its obligation to pay contingent compensation: 
[The studio] may recognize revenue when it is actually received, 
while taking expenses when incurred. [That means that when a 
studio licenses a project to a third party, the studio] may not count 
the license fee as revenue until they actually receive it. Even when 
they receive a non-refundable advance, they might not count it as 
income until the time of the broadcast. Meanwhile, they count 
expenses as soon as they are incurred, even if they have not paid 
them. This mismatching of revenues and expenses allows the [studio] 
to delay payment to participants.76 
D. Vertical Integration 
In the television industry, the consolidation of media companies 
into a small number of vertically integrated companies has enabled 
studios and television networks to produce and broadcast programs 
that they themselves own. 77 After the repeal of the Financial Interest 
and Syndication Rules78 in 1995,79 a studio-such as Walt Disney 
Pictures-could acquire a television network-such as ABC-which in 
turn could acquire a distribution arm-such as Buena Vista 
Television-that designates a production company to produce and 
license a television show for broadcast on networks and later for 
74. Hart & Hacker, supra note 57, at 36. 
75. Id. 
76. Bruce Belenky, Film Studio Accounting Issues, BELENKY LAW (Jan. 19, 
2012), http://belenkylaw.com/2012/01/film-studio-accounting-issues/. 
77. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 (describing how vertical 
integration allows conglomerates to control the process of producing and 
distributing media). 
78. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1970) (restricting the number of programs a 
network could own on its prime time television schedule, prohibiting 
networks from syndicating the programs they owned, and preventing 
them from sharing in profits). 
79. See Broad. Serv.; Television Station Ownership, 60 Fed. Reg. 58, 15688 
(Mar. 27, 1995) (allowing television networks to own, produce, 
distribute, and syndicate programs without restriction). 
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syndication to cable companies that share a corporate parent.80 
Vertical integration enabled Disney to control television programs like 
Who Wants to be a Millionaire?31 through subsidiary companies,82 all 
under a previously prohibited ownership structure. 
Critics of vertical integration argue that this ownership model 
allows an integrated company to "dictate the financial terms of 
distribution and syndication because it controls the licensor and 
licensee of the rights in the property. "83 Profit participants complain 
that integrated companies use leverage to structure transactions in a 
manner that delays, diverts, or eliminates payments of contingent 
compensation. 84 Some profit participants have even filed suit against 
studios, alleging that the studio or network did not seek the highest 
possible licensing fee for broadcast rights as it could have obtained if 
affiliated companies did not sit on each side of the bargaining table.85 
E. Rising Costs of Production and Novel Forms of Payment of 
Contingent Compensation Reduce Probability for Net-Profits Participants 
to Collect Payment 
Since most films and television series produced in Hollywood fail 
to earn a positive return on its investment, studios offer the promise 
of contingent compensation so talent can share in a project's financial 
success.86 Moore puts the matter simply: "Most films lose money!"87 
In the television industry, it is customary for a network television 
show-one airing on ABC, NBC, CBS, or FOX-to air 100 original 
80. Id. 
81. Who Wants to Be A Millionaire? (Valleycrest Prod. 1999). Each of the 
entities identified in this example was an affiliate or subsidiary of The 
Walt Disney Co. when Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? was produced. 
82. See, e.g., Celador Int'l v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 850 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that ABC and Buena Vista Television are 
both subsidiaries of the Walt Disney Co. and that these subsidiaries 
control Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?). 
83. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 30 ("In this way, the parent 
corporation of both the affiliated licensor and licensee can manipulate 
their negotiations tc:i best serve the corporation's interest."). 
84. Id. at 34-35 (noting that studios have a great deal of leverage of clients 
in the contract negotiation process). 
85. Id. at 32 (listing self-dealing claims brought by profit participants 
against media conglomerates that ultimately settled out of court). 
86. Id. 
87. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 13 (claiming that 803 of movies fail to 
recoup their production and distribution costs); Sills & Axelrod, supra 
note 8, at 31 (estimating the standard studio contract results in profits 
for the participant in less than five percent of all films released). 
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episodes or more to gain access to the lucrative syndication market.88 
Hit projects offset the losses incurred from failures, incentivizing 
owners to limit contingent compensation paid to profit participants.89 
The result is a paradox. Disputes over payment of contingent 
compensation arise most frequently when a project is a blockbuster 
success, meaning it is unlikely for a studio to avoid payment by 
claiming that there is no pool of net profits from which to draw funds. 
Additionally, the likelihood that a film or television show will 
yield net profits has diminished as a result of rising production and 
distribution costs and increasing payments to high-profile creative 
talent.90 In 2004, the Motion Picture Association of American · 
announced that the average cost of a Hollywood motion picture 
exceeded $100 million.91 Star actors and directors like Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Steven Spielberg have the power to influence 
which films end up in theatres and to demand contingent 
compensation based on a film's gross receipts, regardless of the film's 
net profits. 92 
Outside of gross-participation agreements for megawatt 
celebrities, even star actors face obstacles in recouping profits.93 For 
instance, actor Leonardo DiCaprio faced this problem following the 
blockbuster success of Titanic. DiCaprio earned $1.8 million plus 183 
of net profits in connection with the film. Yet, after it earned a total 
of $2 billion in global box office receipts and won the 1997 Academy 
Award for Best Picture, the film's studio told DiCaprio that he would 
not receive a net profits payment because Titanic did not earn a 
profit (for his next film, DiCaprio received a guaranteed salary of $20 
million).94 After the film Good Will Hunting95 earned $226 million in 
88. See Eric Hynes, Tube Tied, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2009, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/12/t 
ube_tied.html ("Stations are traditionally interested in acquiring first-
run syndication rights only once a series has amassed 100 episodes"). 
89. Connors, supra note 42, at 843 (noting "suspicion and resentment 
continue to surround the net profits formula, now derisively referred to 
as "Hollywood accounting"). 
90. Id. at 847 (analyzing the current net profits formula). 
91. Hollywood film budgets top $100m, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2004, 3:35 PM) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3564377.stm (reporting the 
average cost per movie for production and distribution was $64 million 
and $39 million respectively). 
92. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that talent agencies increased 
movie star compensation by eschewing long-term contracts for single-
project contracts). 
93. SHERRl L. BURR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERJALS ON FILM, TELEVISION, AND MUSIC 269, n. 3 (West 4th 
ed. 2004) (discussing compensation based on net profits). 
94. Id. 
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worldwide box office, actor Ben Affleck recalled, "[W]e had gotten an 
accounting statement that said the movie was $50 million in the red, 
and it was just like, This is fucked! You had to do some great 
accounting to hide net profits on that movie. "96 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE STUDIO-PARTICIPANT 
RELATIONSHIP 
A fiduciary relationship exists where one of the parties has a 
professional duty to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of 
the other party.97 The relationship is "founded upon the trust and 
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of 
another" and prohibits the duty-holder from exploiting his position 
for personal gain. 98 In commercial relationships, such as those 
between attorneys and clients, trustees and beneficiaries, partners in a 
partnership, and members of a joint venture, fiduciary duties arise as 
a matter of law.99 Outside of those formal relationships, where no 
fiduciary relationship is stipulated in the parties' agreement, such 
du:ties may arise by the conduct of the parties. 100 
Fiduciary obligations create a higher standard of care than those 
between parties to an ordinary contract. 101 The justification for a 
heightened standard of care is based on the parties' exposure to 
95. GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997). 
96. PETER BISKIND, DOWN AND DIRTY PICTURES: MIRAMAX, SUNDANCE, AND 
THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT FILM 310 (2004) (describing how the profit 
participants in Good Will Hunting would have been required to pay for 
an audit if they wanted to contest the amount paid to them under their 
contingent compensation agreement). 
97. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 426 (1937) (inquiring 
into the confidential nature of the relationships between the parties 
involved); In re Marriage of Varner, 55 Cal. App. 4th 128, 141 (1997) 
(analyzing fiduciary duties between spouses). See also Celador Int'l Ltd. 
v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 854 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (denying 
Defendant's motion for dismissal of a breach of fiduciary claim because 
"[p]laintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a joint venture 
existed by virtue of the conduct of the parties."). 
98. Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App.3d 648, 654 (1983) 
(analyzing the manufacturer-distributor relationship in the fiduciary 
duty context). 
99. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud And Deceit § 32 (2001) (defining a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship). 
100. Id. (discussing fiduciary relationships where "the relation and the duties 
involved ... need not be of a legal character, but may be moral, social, 
domestic, or merely personal"). 
101. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (Cardozo, J.) 
("Joint-adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty"). 
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episodes or more to gain access to the lucrative syndication market.ss 
Hit projects offset the losses incurred from failures, incentivizing 
owners to limit contingent compensation paid to profit participants. s9 
The result is a paradox. Disputes over payment of contingent 
compensation arise most frequently when a project is a blockbuster 
success, meaning it is unlikely for a studio to avoid payment by 
claiming that there is no pool of net profits from which to draw funds. 
Additionally, the likelihood that a film or television show will 
yield net profits has diminished as a result of rising production and 
distribution costs and increasing payments to high-profile creative 
talent.90 In 2004, the Motion Picture Association of American · 
announced that the average cost of a Hollywood motion picture 
exceeded $100 million.91 Star actors and directors like Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Steven Spielberg have the power to influence 
which films end up in theatres and to demand contingent 
compensation based on a film's gross receipts, regardless of the film's 
net profits.92 
Outside of gross-participation agreements for megawatt 
celebrities, even star actors face obstacles in recouping profits. 93 For 
instance, actor Leonardo DiCaprio faced this problem following the 
blockbuster success of Titanic. DiCaprio earned $1.8 million plus 183 
of net profits in connection with the film. Yet, after it earned a total 
of $2 billion in global box office receipts and won the 1997 Academy 
Award for Best Picture, the film's studio told DiCaprio that he would 
not receive a net profits payment because Titanic did not earn a 
profit (for his next film, DiCaprio received a guaranteed salary of $20 
million).94 After the film Good Will Hunting95 earned $226 million in 
88. See Eric Hynes, Tube Tied, SLATE (Dec. 23, 2009, 9:38 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/12/t 
ube_tied.html ("Stations are traditionally interested in acquiring first-
run syndication rights only once a series has amassed 100 episodes"). 
89. Connors, supra note 42, at 843 (noting "suspicion and resentment 
continue to surround the net profits formula, now derisively referred to 
as "Hollywood accounting"). 
90. Id. at 847 (analyzing the current net profits formula). 
91. Hollywood film budgets top $100m, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2004, 3:35 PM) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3564377.stm (reporting the 
average cost per movie for production and distribution was $64 million 
and $39 million respectively). 
92. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that talent agencies increased 
movie star compensation by eschewing long-term contracts for single-
project contracts). 
93. SHERRl L. BURR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON FILM, TELEVISION, AND MUSIC 269, n. 3 (West 4th 
ed. 2004) (discussing compensation based on net profits). 
94. Id. 
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worldwide box office, actor Ben Affleck recalled, "[W]e had gotten an 
accounting statement that said the movie was $50 million in the red 
' and it was just like, This is fucked! You had to do some great 
accounting to hide net profits on that movie. "96 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE STUDIO-PARTICIPANT 
RELATIONSHIP 
A fiduciary relationship exists where one of the parties has a 
professional duty to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of 
the other party. 97 The relationship is "founded upon the trust and 
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of 
another" and prohibits the duty-holder from exploiting his position 
for personal gain. 9s In commercial relationships, such as those 
between attorneys and clients, trustees and beneficiaries, partners in a 
partnership, and members of a joint venture, fiduciary duties arise as 
a matter of law.99 Outside of those formal relationships, where no 
fiduciary relationship is stipulated in the parties' agreement, such 
duties may arise by the conduct of the parties.100 
Fiduciary obligations create a higher standard of care than those 
between parties to an ordinary contract. 101 The justification for a 
heightened standard of care is based on the parties' exposure to 
95. GOOD WILL HUNTING (Miramax 1997). 
96. PETER BISKIND, DOWN AND DIRTY PICTURES: MIRAMAX, SUNDANCE, AND 
THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT FILM 310 (2004) (describing how the profit 
participants in Good Will Hunting would have been required to pay for 
an audit if they wanted to contest the amount paid to them under their 
contingent compensation agreement). 
97. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 426 (1937) (inquiring 
into the confidential nature of the relationships between the parties 
involved); In re Marriage of Varner, 55 Cal. App. 4th 128, 141 (1997) 
(analyzing fiduciary duties between spouses). See also Celador Int'l Ltd. 
v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 846, 854 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (denying 
Defendant's motion for dismissal of a breach of fiduciary claim because 
"[p]laintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove a joint venture 
existed by virtue of the conduct of the parties."). 
98. Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App.3d 648, 654 (1983) 
(analyzing the manufacturer-distributor relationship in the fiduciary 
duty context). 
99. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud And Deceit § 32 (2001) (defining a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship). 
100. Id. (discussing fiduciary relationships where "the relation and the duties 
involved ... need not be of a legal character, but may be moral, social, 
domestic, or merely personal"). . 
101. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (Cardozo, J.) 
("Joint-adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the 
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty"). 
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opportunities where the fiduciary could betray the trust of the 
beneficiary, claiming an opportunity for himself without sharing 
information with the beneficiary and thereby depriving the beneficiary 
of the relationship benefits.102 
Profit participants routinely allege that the studio-participant 
relationship is a fiduciary relationship extending beyond those 
contemplated in an ordinary employer-employee relationship.103 Profit 
participants argue they are entitled to heightened protections because 
studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute profits on 
behalf of participants, who play no role in the collection and 
distribution efforts.104 The profit participant relies on the studio to 
provide good faith and accurate profit reporting in connection with 
his contractual right to contingent compensation.105 The studio's 
exclusive control of the monies should give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship, because participants repose trust in the studio to provide 
revenue accounting. 106 However, a fiduciary relationship between 
studios and profit participants would likely impose duties on the 
studio that undermine its negotiated terms in participation 
agreements. Profit-participation agreements are either silent on 
forming a fiduciary relationship or disclaim explicitly any such 
relationship. 107 
In litigation, participants often lose breach of fiduciary duty 
claims on the pleadings, as it is difficult to demonstrate that a studio-
participant contractual relationship is more than an ordinary contract 
bargained for at arm's length.108 In an ordinary contractual 
relationship, the parties do not owe each other any duties beyond 
102. Id. ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace."). See also Robert Flannigan, Commercial Fiduciary 
Obligation, 36 ALBERTA. L. REV. 905, 906 (1998) ("The common 
characteristic of persons generally acknowledged to be fiduciaries is that 
they possess access to property or assets for a defined or limited 
purpose"). 
103. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing how profit 
participants attempt to dispel the studios' assertions that no fiduciary 
relationship exists in the studio-profit participant relationship). 
104. See generally id.· 
105. Id. (detailing profit participants' arguments that a fiduciary relationship 
exists and therefore, they are entitled to an accounting from the 
studios). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (discussing studio arguments that no fiduciary relationship exists). 
108. See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 30 (2003) 
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty); Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't. Inc., 184 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1312 
(2010) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the 
pleadings). 
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those set forth in the contract. 109 Nonetheless, some participants 
have achieved limited success in some circumstances in having a court 
recognize a fiduciary relationship between a studio and a 
participant.110 
A. Courts Do Not Recognize a Fiduciary Relationship in an Exclusive 
Distribution Agreement But Suggests a Duty to Account For Revenues 
Creative talent challenging . their diminished or complete lack of 
contingent compensation base their argument for finding a fiduciary 
relationship on a fifty-year-old decision suggesting a duty to account 
for revenues earned in connection to a film's distribution. In Waverly 
Productions, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc.,m a producer formed an 
agreement with a studio to distribute two of the producer's films 
around the globe and required payment of profit participation based 
on revenues earned from the distribution of the films. 112 The 
distributor, RKO, sublicensed the distribution rights to foreign 
distributors and otherwise made sparse efforts to distribute the 
films.113 Waverly, the producer, sued, claiming RKO's conduct 
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. 114 The court rejected 
Waverly's claim, holding "[t]he [distribution] contract is an elaborate 
one which undertakes to define the respective rights and duties of the 
parties ... [a] mere contract or a debt does not constitute a trust or 
create a fiduciary relationship. "115 But the court went on to note "[I]t 
[is] clear that RKO was not a fiduciary with respect to the 
performance of the·terms of this contract (except as to accounting for 
rentals received) and that arguments predicated on the assumption 
that it was are directed at a false issue. "116 
The dictum from Waverly was recognized in Recorded Picture 
Co. (Productions) Ltd. v. Nelson Entertainment, Inc., 117 in which the 
court found that no fiduciary relationship existed between a film 
producer and distributor, and further, that no fiduciary relationship 
existed between a film distributor and subdistributor, who have no 
109. See infra Part III.A. 
110. See infra Part III.C. 
111. 217 Cal. App.2d 721 (1963). 
112. Id. at 724-27. 
113. Id. at 726 (detailing RKO's ability to sublicense distribution rights to 
foreign distributers under the agreement). 
114. Id. at 724. 
115. Id. at 731-32. 
116. Id. at 734 (emphasis added). 
117. 53 Cal. App.4th 350 (1997). 
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opportunities where the fiduciary could betray the trust of the 
beneficiary, claiming an opportunity for himself without sharing 
information with the beneficiary and thereby depriving the beneficiary 
of the relationship benefits.102 
Profit participants routinely allege that the studio-participant 
relationship is a fiduciary relationship extending beyond those 
contemplated in an ordinary employer-employee relationship. 103 Profit 
participants argue they are entitled to heightened protections because 
studios take on the duty to collect revenues and distribute profits on 
behalf of participants, who play no role in the collection and 
distribution efforts.104 The profit participant relies on the studio to 
provide good faith and accurate profit reporting in connection with 
his contractual right to contingent compensation.105 The studio's 
exclusive control of the monies should give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship, because participants repose trust in the studio to provide 
revenue accounting. 106 However, a fiduciary relationship between 
studios and profit participants would likely impose duties on the 
studio that undermine its negotiated terms in participation 
agreements. Profit-participation agreements are either silent on 
forming a fiduciary relationship or disclaim explicitly any such 
relationship. 107 
In litigation, participants often lose breach of fiduciary duty 
claims on the pleadings, as it is difficult to demonstrate that a studio-
participant contractual relationship is more than an ordinary contract 
bargained for at arm's length.108 In an ordinary contractual 
relationship, the parties do not owe each other any duties beyond 
102. Id. ("A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace."). See also Robert Flannigan, Commercial Fiduciary 
Obligation, 36 ALBERTA. L. REV. 905, 906 (1998) ("The common 
characteristic of persons generally acknowledged to be fiduciaries is that 
they possess access to property or assets for a defined or limited 
purpose"). 
103. See Stein & Harris, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing how profit 
participants attempt to dispel the studios' assertions that no fiduciary 
relationship exists in the studio-profit participant relationship). 
104. See generally id. 
105. Id. (detailing profit participants' arguments that a fiduciary relationship 
exists and therefore, they are entitled to an accounting from the 
studios). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (discussing studio arguments that no fiduciary relationship exists). 
108. See, e.g., Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 30 (2003) 
(granting defendant's motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty); Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entm't. Inc., 184 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1312 
(2010) (dismissing plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim on the 
pleadings). 
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those set forth in the contract. 109 Nonetheless, some participants 
have achieved limited success in some circumstances in having a court 
recognize a fiduciary relationship between a studio and a 
participant. 110 
A. Courts Do Not Recognize a Fiduciary Relationship in an Exclusive 
Distribution Agreement But Suggests a Duty to Account For Revenues 
Creative talent challenging . their diminished or complete lack of 
contingent compensation base their argument for finding a fiduciary 
relationship on a fifty-year-old decision suggesting a duty to account 
for revenues earned in connection to a film's distribution. In Waverly 
Productions, Inc. v. RKO General, Inc., 111 a producer formed an 
agreement with a studio to distribute two of the producer's films 
around the globe and required payment of profit participation based 
on revenues earned from the distribution of the films. 112 The 
distributor, RKO, sublicensed the distribution rights to foreign 
distributors and otherwise made sparse efforts to distribute the 
films.113 Waverly, the producer, sued, claiming RKO's conduct 
constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.114 The court rejected 
Waverly's claim, holding "[t]he [distribution] contract is an elaborate 
one which undertakes to define the respective rights and duties of the 
parties ... [a] mere contract or a debt does not constitute a trust or 
create a fiduciary relationship. "115 But the court went on to note "[I]t 
[is] clear that RKO was not a fiduciary with respect to the 
performance of the· terms of this contract (except as to accounting for 
rentals received) and that arguments predicated on the assumption 
that it was are directed at a false issue. "116 
The dictum from Waverly was recognized in Recorded Picture 
Co. (Productions) Ltd. v. Nelson Entertainment, Inc., 117 in which the 
court found that no fiduciary relationship existed between a film 
producer and distributor, and further, that no fiduciary relationship 
existed between a film distributor and subdistributor, who have no 
109. See infra Part III.A. 
110. See infra Part III.C. 
111. 217 Cal. App.2d 721 (1963). 
112. Id. at 724-27. 
113. Id. at 726 (detailing RKO's ability to sublicense distribution rights to 
foreign distributers under the agreement). 
114. Id. at 724. 
115. Id. at 731-32. 
116. Id. at 734 (emphasis added). 
117. 53 Cal. App.4th 350 (1997). 
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privity of contract.U8 In Recorded Picture, the parties disputed the 
amount of money owed to the producer from the sale of home videos 
of the film The Last Emperor. 119 The producer, Recorded Picture, 
entered into a distribution agreement with the Hemdale Film Corp. 
that required all subdistributors to pay a percentage of the proceeds 
directly to Recorded Picture, but Hemdale did not notify Nelson 
Entertainment, one of the subdistributors, of this requirement. 120 
After Hemdale filed for bankruptcy, Recorded Picture sued Nelson to 
compel payment of seventy percent of home-video gross receipts 
instead of the fifty percent Nelson initially arranged in the 
subdistribution agreement with Hemdale.121 The court found that 
Nelson was not bound by the same terms as Hemdale because no 
contract existed that would give rise to an obligation to account for 
profits. 122 But the court, following Waverly, added that a contractual 
relationship between Hemdale and Nelson gave rise to a "fiduciary 
duty to the producer to provide an accounting of proceeds 
received. "123 In other words, studios find support in court decisions 
where an agreement grants the distributor an exclusive right to 
distribute films and requires him to pay a percentage of the proceeds 
to the owner .124 The parties do not form a special relationship in 
these instances.125 
In other areas of the entertainment industry, courts have 
recognized the requirement to pay money to a contractual partner 
creates nothing more than a creditor-debtor relationship. For 
example, in Oakland Raiders v. National Football League,126 the 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the 
professional football league, holding the league's obligation to allocate 
118. Id. at 374 (holding for the defendant, Nelson). 
119. Id. at 356; THE LAST EMPEROR (Columbia Pictures 1987). 
120. Recorded Picture, 53 Cal. App.4th at 357 (stating the provision was put 
into the contract because producer "did not trust" distributor to collect 
payments from subdistributors). 
121. Id. at 356. 
122. Id. at 363 ("We decline to adopt the rule proposed by the producers-
that a company must comply with a contract to which it is not a party 
if it has accepted even a portion of the benefits of that contract through 
a subsequent, separate agreement with one of the original contracting 
parties. Such a rule would lead to absurd consequences"). 
123. Id. at 371 n.10. 
124. See, e.g., Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540, 542 
(2d Cir. 1962) (characterizing the parties' agreement as an arm's-length 
contract that does not rise to level of fiduciary). 
125. Id. 
126. 93 Cal. App.4th 572 (2001). 
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a share of profits to each team does not give rise to a joint venture 
between the league and an individual team. 127 
B. A Fiduciary Relationship is Recognized Based on the Nature of the 
Parties' Dealings 
Participation agreements routinely disclaim the formation of any 
heightened relationship between the studio and the talent participant 
or ignore mention of it entirely.128 In litigation, profit participants 
attempt to transform breach of contract claims into tort claims 
alleging reliance upon the studio to report the project's revenues 
completely and accurately. 129 When the studio exercises exclusive 
control over a project's financial information, the participant may 
argue that a fiduciary relationship has been formed by implication, 
meaning the burden of proof shifts to the studio to disprove the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship. 13° Courts seldom accept such 
implied fiduciary-duty claims, and frequently dismiss them on the 
pleadings.131 However, on rare occasions, these fiduciary duty claims 
survive motions for summary judgment.132 
Despite disclaimers or silence in agreements, courts are willing to 
find fiduciary relationships where the parties' conduct gives rise to an 
association characterized as a partnership or joint venture. For 
instance, in April Enterprises v. KTTV, 133 the renowned ventriloquist 
Paul Winchell entered into an agreement with a television station, 
KTTV, to produce a children's television program. 134 The contract 
contained a profit-sharing provision in the event the program entered 
into the syndication market. 135 Years after the program's broadcast 
ended, the ventriloquist discovered that the station erased tape 
recordings of the program, removing the program entirely from its 
127. Id. at 592. 
128. See, e.g., April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983). 
129. See, e.g., Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972). 
130. See, e.g., Sander/Moses Prods., Inc. v. NBC Studios, Inc., 142 Cal. 
App.4th 1086, 1095 (2006) (discussing standard and shifting burdens of 
proof). 
131. See, e.g., Ladd, v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 
(2010). 
132. See, e.g., Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846 
(C.D.Cal. 2004). But see Sander/Moses, 142 Cal. App.4th at 1093 
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
133. April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983). 
134. Id. at 814. 
135. Id. 
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privity of contract. 118 In Recorded Picture, the parties disputed the 
amount of money owed to the producer from the sale of home videos 
of the film The Last Emperor. 119 The producer, Recorded Picture, 
entered into a distribution agreement with the Hemdale Film Corp. 
that required all subdistributors to pay a percentage of the proceeds 
directly to Recorded Picture, but Hemdale did not notify N elso.n 
Entertainment, one of the subdistributors, of this requirement. 120 
After Hemdale filed for bankruptcy, Recorded Picture sued Nelson to 
compel payment of seventy percent of home-video gross receipts 
instead of the fifty percent Nelson initially arranged in the 
subdistribution agreement with Hemdale.121 The court found that 
Nelson was not bound by the same terms as Hemdale because no 
contract existed that would give rise to an obligation to account for 
profits. 122 But the court, following Waverly, added that a contractual 
relationship between Hemdale and Nelson gave rise to a "fiduciary 
duty to the producer to provide an accounting of proceeds 
received. "123 In other words, studios find support in court decisions 
where an agreement grants the distributor an exclusive right to 
distribute films and requires him to pay a percentage of the proceeds 
to the owner .124 The parties do not form a special relationship in 
these instances.125 
In other areas of the entertainment industry, courts have 
recognized the requirement to pay money to a contractual partner 
creates nothing more than a creditor-debtor relationship. For 
example, in Oakland Raiders v. National Football League,126 the 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment granted in favor of the 
professional football league, holding the league's obligation to allocate 
118. Id. at 374 (holding for the defendant, Nelson). 
119. Id. at 356; THE LAST EMPEROR (Columbia Pictures 1987). 
120. Recorded Picture, 53 Cal. App.4th at 357 (stating the provision was put 
into the contract because producer "did not trust" distributor to collect 
payments from subdistributors). 
121. Id. at 356. 
122. Id. at 363 ("We decline to adopt the rule proposed by the producers-
that a company must comply with a contract to which it is not a party 
if it has accepted even a portion of the benefits of that contract through 
a subsequent, separate agreement with one of the original contracting 
parties. Such a rule would lead to absurd consequences"). 
123. Id. at 371 n.10. 
124. See, e.g., Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540, 542 
(2d Cir. 1962) (characterizing the parties' agreement as an arm's-length 
contract that does not rise to level of fiduciary). 
125. Id. 
126. 93 Cal. App.4th 572 (2001). 
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a share of profits to each team does not give rise to a joint venture 
between the league and an individual team. 127 
B. A Fiduciary Relationship is Recognized Based on the Nature of the 
Parties' Dealings 
Participation agreements routinely disclaim the formation of any 
heightened relationship between the studio and the talent participant 
or ignore mention of it entirely. 128 In litigation, profit participants 
attempt to transform breach of contract claims into tort claims 
alleging reliance upon the studio to report the project's revenues 
completely and accurately. 129 When the studio exercises exclusive 
control over a project's financial information, the participant may 
argue that a fiduciary relationship has been formed by implication, 
meaning the burden of proof shifts to the studio to disprove the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship. 13° Courts seldom accept such 
implied fiduciary-duty claims, and frequently dismiss them on the 
pleadings.131 However, on rare occasions, these fiduciary duty claims 
survive motions for summary judgment.132 
Despite disclaimers or silence in agreements, courts are willing to 
find fiduciary relationships where the parties' conduct gives rise to an 
association characterized as a partnership or joint venture. For 
instance, in April Enterprises v. KTTV, 133 the renowned ventriloquist 
Paul Winchell entered into an agreement with a television station, 
KTTV, to produce a children's television program.134 The contract 
contained a profit-sharing provision in the event the program entered 
into the syndication market. 135 Years after the program's broadcast 
ended, the ventriloquist discovered that the station erased tape 
recordings of the program, removing the program entirely from its 
127. Id. at 592. 
128. See, e.g., April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983). 
129. See, e.g., Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972). 
130. See, e.g., Sander/Moses Prods., Inc. v. NBC Studios, Inc., 142 Cal. 
App.4th 1086, 1095 (2006) (discussing standard and shifting burdens of 
proof). 
131. See, e.g., Ladd, v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 
(2010). 
132. See, e.g., Celador Int'l Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846 
(C.D.Cal. 2004). But see Sander/Moses, 142 Cal. App.4th at 1093 
(granting defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
133. April Enter., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App.3d 805 (1983). 
134. Id. at 814. 
135. Id. 
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library.136 Winchell brought suit, and in its defense, KTTV pointed to 
a disclaimer in the agreement stating the parties did not form a joint 
venture; the court rejected this contention because it concluded that 
parties' conduct may create a joint venture. 137 
The relationship between a musician and a recording house has 
faced similar questions regarding the creation of a fiduciary 
relationship.138 In Apple Records, Inc. v. Capital Records, Inc., 139 a 
New York court found _the extensive, decade-spanning business 
dealings between the recording studio and the Beatles gave rise to a 
special relationship of trust and confidence.140 The court stated that 
the relationship "existed independent of the contractual duties" when 
the recording studio distributed promotional records secretly to earn 
goodwill with other bands and enhance its business.141 
A long history of business dealings involving payment obligations 
also gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. In Carpenter Foundation v. 
Oakes, 142 the plaintiff entrusted materials relating to the practice and 
historical development of Christian Science to the defendant, a close 
friend, to make available for "qualified" students of the religion at 
cost .143 The defendant established a book business and sold materials 
to customers contrary to the plaintiff's stated wishes. 144 The court 
found the friendship forged between the parties was one of trust and 
confidence; therefore, the defendant had a duty to make payments 
outside of the contractual relationship. 145 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 820 ("[T]he conduct of the parties may create a joint venture 
despite an express declaration to the contrary"). 
138. See Rodgers v. Roulette Records, 677 F. Supp. 731, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(declining to find a fiduciary relationship where defendant collected 
royalties on behalf of plaintiff in the form of royalties and licensing fees); 
Cooper v. Sony Records Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 233 (RMB), 2001 WL 
1223492, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (musician's fiduciary duty claim fails 
even though studio exercised exclusive control over the recordings 
during the agreement and promised a percentage of the proceeds from 
the exploitation of the recordings). 
139. 137 A.D.2d 50 (1988). 
140. Id. at 57. 
141. Id. 
142. 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972). 
143. Id. at 788. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 798. 
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C. Based on Wolf, No Fiduciary Relationship Exists Between a Studio 
and Participant on the Sole Basis of a Right to Share Profits 
"?nder California law, one party's exclusive control over 
contmgent comp_ensation does not make that party a fiduciary in the 
absence of other evidence. 146 In Wolf v. Superior Court 147 the 
appellate court denied a writ of mandate sought by Gar; Wolf 
author of the 1981 novel Who Censored Roger Rabbit?, whose book 
served as the basis for the Disney film Who Framed Roger Rabbit?.148 
Wolf so~ght to. vacate a lower court's order sustaining demurrer to 
Walt Disney Pictures and Television's demurrer for Wolf's claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty. 149 
The dispute in Wolf stemmed from an agreement between Wolf 
and· J?isney.150 Wal~ assigned the rights to his novel and the Roger 
Rabbit characters m exchange for a salary and five percent of the 
gross. re.venues earned from merchandising royalties or other 
expl~itat10n of the Roger Rabbit characters.151 The agreement also 
provided Wolf audit rights so he could gain access to the movie's 
books and records. 152 
. Wolf alleged ~hat when he attempted to exercise his audit rights, 
Disney refused him access to the relevant financial records and did 
not disclose the nature of its promotional agreements with third 
parties, including compensation.153 Wolf also alleged that Disney 
underreported revenues earned in connection with the exploitation of 
the Rog~r R~bbit characters, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty 
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.154 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
Wo.lf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 27 (2003) ("[C]ontingent 
entitlement to future compensation within the exclusive control of one. 
?ar~J'." does ~ot make that party a fiduciary in the absence of other 
mdicia . . . . ) . 
Id. at 25. 
Id. See WHO FRAMED ROGER RABBIT? (Walt Disney Pictures 1988); see 
also Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, Box OFFICE MoJO 
h~tp://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=whoframedrogerrabbit.htm (last 
visited .Mar. 11, 2012) (Who Framed Roger Rabbit'? was an enormous 
box-office success, earning more than $300 million in worldwide revenues 
after its release in 1988). 
Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 27. 
Id. 
Id. at 27-28. 
Id. at 28. 
Id. 
Id. 
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library.135 Winchell brought suit, and in its de~ense~ KTTV point~d_to 
a disclaimer in the agreement stating the parties did not form a JOmt 
venture; the court rejected this contention because it concluded that 
. . t t 137 parties' conduct may create a ]Om ven ure. . 
The relationship between a musician and a recordmg h~use _has 
faced similar questions regarding the creation of a fiduciary 
relationship. 138 In Apple Records, Inc. v. Capital Reco~ds, Inc.: 139 a 
New York court found _the extensive, decade-spanmng ~usmess 
dealings between the recording studio and the Beatles gave nse to a 
special relationship of trust and confidence.140 The court st_at~,d that 
the relationship "existed independent of the contractual duties when 
the recording studio distributed promotional records secretly to earn 
h . b . 141 goodwill with other bands and en ance i:s us~ness. . . 
A long history of business dealings mvolvmg payment obhg~t10ns 
also gives rise to a fiduciary relationship. In Carpenter Found~tion v. 
Oakes, 142 the plaintiff entrusted materials relating to the practice and 
historical development of Christian Science to the defendant,_~ close 
friend, to make available for "qualified" stu~ents of the rehg10n_ at 
cost.143 The defendant established a book busmess and sold matenals 
to customers contrary to the plaintiff's stated wishes. 144 The court 
found the friendship forged between the parties was one of trust and 
confidence; therefore, the defendant had a duty to make payments 
1 1 . h" 145 outside of the contractua re at10ns ip. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 820 ("[T]he conduc_t of the parties ~~y create a joint venture 
despite an express declaration to the contrary ) . 
138. 
139. 
See Rodgers v. Roulette Records, 677 F. Supp. 731, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(-d li · to find a fiduciary relationship where defendant collected ec mng . d li · £ ) · 
royalties on behalf of plaintiff in the form of royalties an censmg ees , 
Cooper v. Sony Records Int'l, No. 00 Civ. 233 (RMB), 20?1 ~L 
1223492, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (musician's fiduciary duty claim ~ails 
even though studio exercised exclusive control over the recordmgs 
during the agreement and promised a percentage of the proceeds from 
the exploitation of the recordings). 
137 A.D.2d 50 (1988). 
140. Id. at 57. 
141. Id. 
142. 26 Cal. App.3d 784 (1972). 
143. Id. at 788. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 798. 
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C. Based on Wolf, No Fiduciary Relationship Exists Between a Studio 
and Participant on the Sole Basis of a Right to Share Profits 
'~ 
Under California law, one party's exclusive control over 
contingent compensation does not make that party a fiduciary in the 
absence of other evidence. 146 In Wolf v. Superior Court, 147 the 
appellate court denied a writ of mandate sought by Gary Wolf, 
author of the 1981 novel Who Censored Roger Rabbit?, whose book 
served as the basis for the Disney film Who Framed Roger Rabbit?.148 
Wolf sought to vacate a lower court's order sustaining demurrer to 
Walt Disney Pictures and Television's demurrer for Wolf's claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty. 149 
The dispute in Wolf stemmed from an agreement between Wolf 
and· Disney.150 Wolf assigned the rights to his novel and the Roger 
Rabbit characters in exchange for a salary and five percent of the 
gross revenues earned from merchandising royalties or other 
exploitation of the Roger . Rabbit characters. 151 The agreement also 
provided Wolf audit rights so he could gain access to the movie's 
books and records. 152 
Wolf alleged that when he attempted to exercise his audit rights, 
Disney refused him access to the relevant financial records and did 
not disclose the nature of its promotional agreements with third 
parties, including compensation.153 Wolf also alleged that Disney 
underreported revenues earned in connection with the exploitation of 
the Roger Rabbit characters, constituting a breach of fiduciary duty 
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 154 
146. Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25, 27 (2003) ("[C]ontingent 
entitlement to future compensation within the exclusive control of one -
party does not make that party a fiduciary in the absence of other 
indicia .... "). 
147. Id. at 25. 
148. Id. See WHO FRAMED ROGER RABBIT? (Walt Disney Pictures 1988); see 
also Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, Box OFFICE MOJO, 
http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=whoframedrogerrabbit.htm (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2012) (Who Framed Roger Rabbit'? was an enormous 
box-office success, earning more than $300 million in worldwide revenues 
after its release in 1988). 
149. Wolf, 107 Gal. App.4th at 27. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 27-28. 
152. Id. at 28. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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The court rejected Wolf's assertion that Disney owed him a 
fiduciary duty to account for revenues completely and accurately.155 
Based on New v. New156 and Wiltsee v. California Employment 
Commission, 157 the Court held that the right to receive contingent 
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself, 
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments.158 It 
went on to discredit Wolf's interpretation of the opinions in Waverly 
and Nelson: 
Wolf misapprehends the import of the Waverly court's recognition 
of the producer's right to an accounting of proceeds received from 
subdistributors. Either a relationship is fiduciary in character or not. 
Whether the parties are fiduciaries is governed by the nature of the 
relationship, not by the remedy sought. Waverly recognized simply 
that RKO had a duty to account, not that RKO was a fiduciary with 
respect to its accounting obligation.159 
In other words, a profit-sharing agreement may include a right to 
an accounting even without a fiduciary relationship, when an 
accounting is part and parcel to the contract. 160 The right of an 
accounting, the court wrote, "can be derived not from a fiduciary 
duty, but simply from the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inherent in every contract, because without an accounting, 
there may be no way 'by which such [a] party [entitled to share in 
profits] could determine whether there were any profits. "'161 
Factors such as fairness and practicality weighed in favor of 
shifting the evidentiary burden to Disney to prove the relationship 
with Wolf was not fiduciary in character when financial information 
was held exclusively under Disney's control.162 But the court found 
155. Id. at 40-41. 
156. 148 Cal. App.2d 372, 382 (1957) (ex-husband's contractual obligation to 
pay former wife a percentage of stock earnings created a debt obligation 
not a fiduciary duty). ' 
157. 69 Cal. App.2d 120 (1945) (employment contract entitling employee to 
253 of future profits neither created a joint venture nor gave rise to a 
fiduciary relationship). 
158. Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 30-31. ("[T]he contractual right to contingent 
compensation in the control of another has never, by itself been 
sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship where one would not 
otherwise exist."). 
159. Id. at 34. 
160. Id. ("The duty to provide an accounting of profits ... is appropriately 
premised on the principle . . . that a party may have a right to 
accounting, even absent a fiduciary relationship, when such a right is 
inherent in the nature of the contract itself."). 
161. Id. (citing Nelson, 29 Cal.2d at 751). 
162. Id. at 36. ("In cases where the financial records essential to proving the 
contingent compensation owed are in exclusive control of the defendant, 
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the evidentiary burden "does not alter the contractual nature of the 
parties' relationship" and held that those factors "cannot serve to 
create a fiduciary relationship where one does not otherwise exist. "163 
Judge Johnson's dissent in Wolf argued the majority opinion left 
open a slim possibility for the court, if comprised of different judges, 
to find favorably for the participant on important procedural 
questions. 164 He suggested a different panel of judges would hold that 
evidence put forth in support of the existence of a joint venture 
should be admitted before the trial court because the evidence would 
help determine the question of whether fiduciary duties existed as a 
matter of law.165 Sympathizing with Wolf, the dissent found it 
premature to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the 
pleadings.166 In his opinion, he wrote: 
[E]vidence may emerge demonstrating that once Disney decided 
to make the movie and exploit the characters Wolf created, the 
two of them embarked on a joint venture. If so, Disney would 
owe a fiduciary duty to its co-adventurer even though the terms 
of the written contract did not defined a joint· venture and 
despite the fact Disney had managed to insert contract language 
asserting this was only to be a debtor-creditor relationship. 167 
If a fiduciary duty were imposed, it would potentially discourage 
studios from using their superior bargaining position and transactional 
knowledge to manipulate the participant into accepting a deal 
promising a percentage of a pool of funds the studio intends to keep 
as low as possible.168 In a studio-participant relationship, "[t]he 
opportunity and temptation to cheat are present in the relationship 
fundamental fairness, the "lodestar" for analysis . . . requires shifting the 
burden of proof to the defendant. In such cases, the essential facts as to 
the contingency and the amount owed lie in the exclusive knowledge 
and control of the defendant, placing the defendant in a far better 
position to prove satisfaction of its payment obligation.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 37 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 42. ("I am unprepared at this early stage of the proceedings, in 
the absence of evidence before the trial court, to determine no such 
fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law."). 
167. Id. at 39-40. 
168. Id. at 42. ("[T]here appears to be ... a need to impose a fiduciary duty 
on the performance of that accounting responsibility in order to 
discourage Disney 'from taking unfair advantage of' its special position . 
.. '. "). 
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The court rejected Wolf's assertion that Disney owed him a 
fiduciary duty to account for revenues completely and accurately.155 
Based on New v. N ew156 and Wiltsee v. California Employment 
Commission, 157 the Court held that the right to receive contingent 
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself, 
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments. 158 It 
went on to discredit Wolf's interpretation of the opinions in Waverly 
and Nelson: 
Wolf misapprehends the import of the Waverly court's recognition 
of the producer's right to an accounting of proceeds received from 
subdistributors. Either a relationship is fiduciary in character or not. 
Whether the parties are fiduciaries is governed by the nature of the 
relationship, not by the remedy sought. Waverly recognized simply 
that RKO had a duty to account, not that RKO was a fiduciary with 
respect to its accounting obligation.159 
In other words, a profit-sharing agreement may include a right to 
an accounting even without a fiduciary relationship, when an 
accounting is part and parcel to the contract.160 The right of an 
accounting, the court wrote, "can be derived not from a fiduciary 
duty, but simply from the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inherent in every contract, because without an accounting, 
there may be no way 'by which such [a] party [entitled to share in 
profits] could determine whether there were any profits. "'161 
Factors such as fairness and practicality weighed in favor of 
shifting the evidentiary burden to Disney to prove the relationship 
with Wolf was not fiduciary in character when financial information 
was held exclusively under Disney's control. 162 But the court found 
155. Id. at 40-41. 
156. 148 Cal. App.2d 372, 382 (1957) (ex-husband's contractual obligation to 
pay former wife a percentage of stock earnings created a debt obligation, 
not a fiduciary duty). 
157. 69 Cal. App.2d 120 (1945) (employment contract entitling employee to 
253 of future profits neither created a joint venture nor gave rise to a 
fiduciary relationship). 
158. Wolf, 107 Cal. App.4th at 30-31. ("[T]he contractual right to contingent 
compensation in the control of another has never, by itself, been 
sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship where one would not 
otherwise exist."). 
159. Id. at 34. 
160. Id. ("The duty to provide an accounting of profits ... is appropriately 
premised on the principle . . . that a party may have a right to 
accounting; even absent a fiduciary relationship, when such a right is 
inherent in the nature of the contract itself."). 
161. Id. (citing Nelson, 29 Cal.2d at 751). 
162. Id. at 36. ("In cases where the financial records essential to proving the 
contingent compensation owed are in exclusive control of the defendant, 
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the evidentiary burden "does not alter the contractual nature of the 
parties' relationship" and held that those factors "cannot serve to 
create a fiduciary relationship where one does not otherwise exist. "163 
Judge Johnson's dissent in Wolf argued the majority opinion left 
open a slim possibility for the court, if comprised of different judges, 
to find favorably for the participant on important procedural 
questions. 164 He suggested a different panel of judges would hold that 
evidence put forth in support of the existence of a joint venture 
should be admitted before the trial court because the evidence would 
help determine the question of whether fiduciary duties existed as a 
matter of law. 165 Sympathizing with Wolf, the dissent found it 
premature to dismiss the claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the 
pleadings.166 In his opinion, he wrote: 
[E]vidence may emerge demonstrating that once Disney decided 
to make the movie and exploit the characters Wolf created, the 
two of them embarked on a joint venture. If so, Disney would 
owe a fiduciary duty to its co-adventurer even though the terms 
of the written contract did not defined a joint· venture and 
despite the fact Disney had managed to insert contract language 
asserting this was only to be a debtor-creditor relationship. 167 
If a fiduciary duty were imposed, it would potentially discourage 
studios from using their superior bargaining position and transactional 
knowledge to manipulate the participant into accepting a deal 
promising a percentage of a pool of funds the studio intends to keep 
as low as possible.168 In a studio-participant relationship, "[t]he 
opportunity and temptation to cheat are present in the relationship 
fundamental fairness, the "lodestar" for analysis ... requires shifting the 
burden of proof to the defendant. In such cases, the essential facts as to 
the contingency and the amount owed lie in the exclusive knowledge 
and control ·of the defendant, placing the defendant in a far better 
position to prove satisfaction of its payment obligation.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 37 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 42. ("I am unprepared at this early stage of the proceedings, in 
the absence of evidence before the trial court, to determine no such 
fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law."). 
167. Id. at 39-40. 
168. Id. at 42. ("[T]here appears to be ... a need to impose a fiduciary duty 
on the performance of that accounting responsibility in order to 
discourage Disney 'from taking unfair advantage of' its special position . 
.. '. "). 
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here just as much as in . . . traditional fiduciary relationships. "169 
Each party understands that when Disney fails to report revenues 
earned in connection with the sale of merchandise inspired by Wolf's 
characters, the result would be "less money for Wolf and more profit 
for Disney. "170 
The dissent concludes on an auspicious note for participants, 
stating that courts should be willing to "impose fiduciary duties on 
certain business relationships. "171 In this case, Judge Johnson wrote 
that he was, "not quite prepared to determine Disney assumed a 
fiduciary duty to maintain honest and accurate records as to its 
exploitation of Wolf's characters. But [that he was] close to such a 
conclusion. "172 
Interestingly, in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 173 the 
court did not allow Ladd, the producer, to present evidence in 
support of his fiduciary duty claim at trial,174 even though he and the 
studio explicitly formed a joint venture in their original agreement.175 
The joint venture agreement stipulated that Ladd would produce 
films that Warner would finance. 176 In addition, Ladd was authorized 
to produce films without first obtaining the studio's approval, a right 
to exercise discretion and control that few producers currently 
enjoy.177 According to Ladd's counsel, the original agreement included 
language stating their relationship was special and, as a result, the 
length of the contract was purposefully short.178 
When the agreement was terminated in 1985, Warner retained the 
obligation to account to Ladd pursuant to the original agreement. 179 
169. Id. at 41-42. 
170. Id. at 42. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
184. Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010). 
174. Id. (summarizing the procedural history of the case, including the fact 
that the trial court "granted nonsuit on Ladd's claim for Blade Runner 
profits .... "). 
175. Id. at 1301. ("[I]n 1979, Warner and Ladd entered into a joint venture, 
essentially a 'mini studio' within a studio."). 
176. Id. {"Ladd had control over development of movies, financing of movies, 
production, and distribution. Warner's role was to finance the films."). 
177. Telephone Interview with John M. Gatti, Partner, Strook & Strook & 
Lavan LLP (Mar. 8, 2012). 
178. Id. 
179. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1301. ("In 1985, the parties entered into a 
Termination Agreement, under which the parties ended their joint 
venture, with Warner remaining obligated to pay Ladd the profit 
participation called for under their earlier agreement."). 
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Ladd filed suit after discovering that Warner had miscounted the 
profits earned for the film Blade Runner. 180 The court rejected Ladd's 
argument that the relationship was created under a joint venture 
relationship and, therefore, activity stemming from that relationship 
should be treated as a joint venture even though it was· terminated. 181 
The duty to account is a fiduciary obligation because it was 
established under the original agreement. 182 The judge dismissed the 
claim on demurrer based on the reasoning in Wolf that once the 
contract is terminated a joint venture no longer exists and therefore 
no fiduciary duties are owed. 183 
However, in Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney 
Co.,184 Judge Cooper of the Central District Court of California 
declined to dismiss Celador's claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 185 
The creators of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? had the opportunity 
at trial to present evidence in support of a joint venture relationship 
by virtue of the conduct of the parties, even though the contract 
stipulated that it did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship. 186 But 
the court went on to note that, based on Wolf, a fiduciary 
relationship cannot be established solely on the foundation of a right 
to share profits187 nor on the basis of a duty to account for profits.188 
Nonetheless, the jury ultimately found that Disney breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case and 
180. Id. at 1302 ("In 2001, Ladd learned [a] Blade Runner investor ... was 
receiving payments from Warner even though Warner had told Lad the 
movie was unprofitable .... Following [an] audit, Ladd filed this instant 
lawsuit .... The gravamen of the action is that Warner deprived Ladd 
of the bargained-for profit participation in the Termination Agreement 
by undervaluing Ladd's films relative to other films in television 
licensing packages."); BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982). 
181. See Gatti, supra nQte 176. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. 347 F. Supp.2d 846 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 
185. Id. at 853-54 (explaining the defendants' argument in reliance on Wolf, 
and how the present case may be distinguished by the plaintiffs' 
allegations of the existence of something akin to a joint venture). 
186. Id. at 854 ("Defendants quote from the contract itself: Nothing herein 
shall constitute or give rise to a partnership between, or joint ventures 
of, the parties .... ") (footnote omitted). 
187. Id. at 853 (noting that pursuant to Wolf "a contingent entitlement to 
future compensation within the exclusive control of one party does not 
make that party a fiduciary .... "). 
188. Id. at 854 (noting that pursuant to Wolf "the duty to account for profits 
does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship."). 
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participation called for under their earlier agreement."). 
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Ladd filed suit after discovering that Warner had miscounted the 
profits earned for the film Blade Runner. 180 The court rejected Ladd's 
argument that the relationship was created under a joint venture 
relationship and, therefore, activity stemming from that relationship 
should be treated as a joint venture even though it was· terminated.181 
The duty to account is a fiduciary obligation because it was 
established under the original agreement. 182 The judge dismissed the 
claim on demurrer based on the reasoning in Wolf that once the 
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However, in Celador International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney 
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relationship cannot be established solely on the foundation of a right 
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allegations of the existence of something akin to a joint venture). 
186. Id. at 854 ("Defendants quote from the contract itself: Nothing herein 
shall constitute or give rise to a partnership between, or joint ventures 
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does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship."). 
469 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Hit Losers 
awarded a multimillion judgment in favor of the creators of the game 
show.189 
IV. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
This Section describes the purpose of the implied covenant and 
explains recent court decisions where courts have devoted the issue 
special attention. It concludes by arguing that the implied covenant 
has provided and will continue to serve as the strongest legal theory 
upon which participants base their claims to receive unpaid 
contingent compensation. 
A. The Implied Covenant Protects the Unspoken Benefits a Party 
Stands to Gain from the Express Terms of the Contract 
In every contract there is an implied duty that neither party will 
act to destroy or frustrate a right of the other party to benefit from 
the express terms of the contract.190 The implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is a staple of contract law, read into contracts 
"in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, 
not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to 
the contract's purpose."191 Accordingly, nearly every American 
jurisdiction recognizes this implied covenant as a matter of common 
law.192 Additionally, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts193 
and the Uniform Commercial Code194 have adopted the implied 
189. See infra Part IV(B.) 
190. See, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d. 654, 658 
(1958) ("There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the 
right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."); see also 
Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 23 Cal.4th 390, 400 
(2000); Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818 (1979); 
Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit Inc., 222 Cal. App.3d 1371, 1393 
(1990). 
191. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., 2 
Cal.4th 342, 373 (1992). 
192. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 53 Cal. 
App.4th 299, 314, (1997) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing . . . . This duty has been recognized 
in the _majority of American jurisdictions .... ") (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement."). 
194. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2011..:2012) ("Every contract or duty within [the 
Uniform Commercial Code] imposes an obligation of good faith in its 
performance and enforcement."). 
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covenant. The parties cannot disclaim or limit the obligation to act 
in good faith by agreement. 195 
The implied covenant is heavily litigated, but serves a narrow 
purpose in interpretation of contracts. In litigation, it arises in 
circumstances where the contract does not state how to deal with a 
situation and where one party exploits the silence to thwart the right 
of the other party to receive the promises the contract expressly 
provided.196 Since the contract does not prescribe whether the 
conduct at issue is forbidden or permitted, the implied covenant is 
used to determine if a party has acted in a manner that is 
unreasonable according to industry standards of conduct and, 
furthermore, if the party has acted in a manner it knew to be 
wrong. 197 The purpose of the inquiry is to determine if the party 
deliberately acted to frustrate the right of the other party to receive 
the benefits the contract expressly provides; put differently, when the 
implied covenant is applied it is "read into contracts in order to 
protect the express covenants or promises of the contract. "198 
Breach of the implied covenant involves "unfair dealing, whether 
or not it also constitutes breach of a consensual contract term, 
prompted by a conscious and deliberate act the 'unfairly frustrates 
the agreed common purposes and . disappoints the reasonable 
expectations of the other party. "'199 The point is to "prevent one 
contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to 
receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. "200 
195. See REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 7 (1997). 
196. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d .373 (1988). 
197. See generally, Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards 
for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has 
Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 4 7 HASTINGS 
L.J. 585, 585 (1995-96) ("Despite its widespread recognition, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is shrouded in mystery."). Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (Good faith is 
violated "even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But 
the oblig{'Ltion goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of 
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty."). 
198. Foley, 765 P.2d at 394. 
199. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 852 
(C.D.Cal. 2004) (citing Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 222 
Cal. App.3d 1371, 1394 (1990)). 
200. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (2000) (emphasis in 
original). 
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has provided and will continue to serve as the strongest legal theory 
upon which participants base their claims to receive unpaid 
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"in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, 
not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to 
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(1958) ("There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the 
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Gareau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit Inc., 222 Cal. App.3d 1371, 1393 
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191. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, Inc., 2 
Cal.4th 342, 373 (1992). 
192. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 53 Cal. 
App.4th 299, 314, (1997) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a 
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prompted by a conscious and deliberate act the 'unfairly frustrates 
the agreed common purposes and . disappoints the reasonable 
expectations of the other party. "'199 The point is to "prevent one 
contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to 
receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. "200 
195. See REV. UNI.F. P'SHIP ACT § 103 cmt. 7 (1997). 
196. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d .373 (1988). 
197. See generally, Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards 
for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has 
Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 4 7 HASTINGS 
L.J. 585, 585 (1995-96) ("Despite its widespread recognition, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is shrouded in mystery."). Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (Good faith is 
violated "even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But 
the obligi'.l,tion goes further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of 
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty."). 
198. Foley, 765 P.2d at 394. 
199. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 852 
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B. The Implied Covenant Is Not Violated When a Contract Grants 
Complete Freedom to Perform an Act or Not 
The implied covenant is not interpreted to forbid a party from 
acting in a manner permitted in the contract. 201 For instance, a 
contract granting a party complete discretion to do something 
includes the right not to perform. If the conduct is within the 
reasonable expectations of the parties as articulated expressly in the 
contract, then a party "can never violate an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. "202 
Good faith and fair dealing is the kind of provision that is hard to 
derive generalizations from because it is very fact-specific, but case 
law is a rich source for describing the subtleties and variations of 
interpretation. In Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, a record 
company entered into an exclusive agreement with musician Tom 
Waits to license one of his albums and pay him a percentage of 
royalties earned in connection with the exploitation of the album.203 
The agreement provided the record company "may at [its] election 
refrain" from marketing the album; Waits sued after the company 
decided against promoting the album or licensing it in any way. 204 
The court held for the record company, finding the language of the 
contract granted them complete discretion to license the album and 
that their decision against promoting it does not mean the company 
·failed to act in good faith. 205 To find otherwise would imply a term 
that contradicts an express term of the contract-something which 
"courts are not at liberty" to do. 206 It is improper for courts perform 
such a function "except in those relatively rare instances when 
reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties' clear 
intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement. "207 
201. Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 
("The general rule [of the duty of good faith and fair dealing] is plainly 
subject to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of 
the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct 
which otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing . . . . "') .. 
202. Id. at 376 (finding that a landlord's decision to terminate lease for his 
own financial benefit does not violate the implied terms of the contract 
because the lease agreement permitted the activity and was therefore 
within the parties' reasonable expectations). 
203. 41 Cal. App.4th 798, 805 (1995). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 809. 
207. Id. at 808. 
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When the appellate court revisited Gary Wolf's campaign for 
additional income in the form of contingent compensation from 
Disney, it relied on Third Story in rendering its decision. At issue in 
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 208 born of the same facts 
governing Wolf v. Superior Court, 209 was whether Disney violated the 
implied covenant by entering into licensing and promotional 
agreements for which Disney did not receive monetary 
compensation. 210 Wolf alleged that Disney entered into such non-
compensatory agreement to avoid having to account on its financial 
books for additional revenues.211 However, the contract provided 
Disney "unfettered discretion . . . to license the Roger Rabbit 
franchise as it 'saw fit.'" 212 On this basis, the appellate court affirmed 
the trial court's decision to sustain the demurrer that Disney did not 
breach the implied covenant.213 
The court dismissed Wolf's contention that the lower court erred 
in not finding it unfair for Disney to enter into agreements with third 
parties that do not promise Wolf any form of royalty payments.214 
Quoting from Third Story, the court added: "It is not enough to say 
that without the proposed implied covenant, the contract would be 
improvident or unwise or would operate unjustly. Parties have the 
right to make such agreements ... [Wolf] was free to accept or reject 
the bargain offered and cannot look to the courts to amend the terms 
that prove unsatisfactory. "215 
To establish a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff must show either that the 
defendant knew he was acting in bad faith, or that the act was 
intended to and did frustrate the common purpose of the contract.216 
208. Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal. App.4th 1107 
(2008). 
209. Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25 (2003). 
210. Wolf v. Walt Disney, 162 Cal. App.4th at 1121. 
211. Id. at 1107. 
212. Id. at 1121. 
213. Id. at 1123 ("[T]he directed verdict was still proper because no 
substantial evidence was presented from which a rational juror could 
find the covenant had been breached."). . 
214. Id. at 1120. 
215. Id. at 1122 (citing Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App.4th 
798, 809 (1995). 
216. Id. at 1120 (citing Carma, Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, 
2 Cal.4th 342, 372 (1992) ("The covenant requires the party holding 
such [discretionary] power to exercise it 'for a·ny purpose within the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to 
capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract 
interpreted objectively."'). · 
473 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Hit Losers 
B. The Implied Covenant Is Not Violated When a Contract Grants 
Complete Freedom to Perform an Act or Not 
The implied covenant is not interpreted to forbid a party from 
acting in a manner permitted in the contract.201 For instance, a 
contract granting a party complete discretion to do something 
includes the right not to perform. If the conduct is within the 
reasonable expectations of the parties as articulated expressly in the 
contract, then a party "can never violate an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. "202 
Good faith and fair dealing is the kind of provision that is hard to 
derive generalizations from because it is very fact-specific, but case 
law is a rich source for describing the subtleties and variations of 
interpretation. In Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, a record 
company entered into an exclusive agreement with musician Tom 
Waits to license one of his albums and pay him a percentage of 
royalties earned in connection with the exploitation of the album.203 
The agreement provided the record company "may at [its] election 
refrain" from marketing the album; Waits sued after the company 
decided against promoting the album or licensing it in any way. 204 
The court held for the record company, finding the language of the 
contract granted them complete discretion to license the album and 
that their decision against promoting it does not mean the company 
·failed to act in good faith. 205 To find otherwise would imply a term 
that contradicts an express term of the contract-something which 
"courts are not at liberty" to do. 206 It is improper for courts perform 
such a function "except in those relatively rare instances when 
reading the provision literally would, contrary to the parties'. clear 
intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement. "207 
201. Carma Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 
("The general rule [of the duty of good faith and fair dealing] is plainly 
subject to the exception that the parties may, by express provisions of 
the contract, grant the right to engage in the very acts and conduct 
which otherwise have been forbidden by an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing .... "') .. 
202. Id. at 376 (finding that a landlord's decision to terminate lease for his 
own financial benefit does not violate the implied terms of the contract 
because the lease agreement permitted the activity and was therefore 
within the parties' reasonable expectations). 
203. 41 Cal. App.4th 798, 805 (1995). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 809. 
207. Id. at 808. 
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When the appellate court revisited Gary Wolf's campaign for 
additional income in the form of contingent compensation from 
Disney, it relied on Third Story in rendering its decision. At issue in 
Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 208 born of the same facts 
governing Wolf v. Superior Court,209 was whether Disney violated the 
implied covenant by entering into licensing and promotional 
agreements for which Disney did not receive monetary 
compensation. 210 Wolf alleged that Disney entered into such non-
compensatory agreement to avoid having to account on its financial 
books for additional revenues.211 However, the contract provided 
Disney "unfettered discretion . . . to license the Rorrnr Rabbit 
franchise as it 'saw fit. "'2i2 On this basis, the appellate cm~rt affirmed 
the trial court's decision to sustain the demurrer that Disney did not 
breach the implied covenant.213 
The court dismissed Wolf's contention that the lower court erred 
in not finding it unfair for Disney to enter into agreements with third 
parties that do not promise Wolf any form of royalty payments.214 
Quoting from Third Story, the court added: "It is not enough to say 
that without the proposed implied covenant, the contract would be 
improvident or unwise or would operate unjustly. Parties have the 
right to make such agreements . . . [Wolf] was free to accept or reject 
the bargain offered and cannot look to the courts to amend the terms 
that prove unsatisfactory. "215 
To establish a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff must show either that the 
defendant knew he was acting in bad faith, or that the act was 
intended to and did frustrate the common purpose of the contract.216 
208. Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television, 162 Cal. App.4th 1107 
(2008). 
209. Wolf v. Super. Court, 107 Cal. App.4th 25 (2003). 
210. Wolf v. Walt Disney, 162 Cal. App.4th at 1121. 
211. Id. at 1107. 
212. Id. at 1121. 
213. Id. at 1123 ("[T]he directed verdict was still proper because no 
substantial evidence was presented from which a rational juror could 
find the covenant had been breached."). 
214. Id. at 1120. 
215. Id. at 1122 (citing Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 41 Cal. App.4th 
798, 809 (1995). 
216. Id. at 1120 (citing Carma, Developers, Inc. v. Marathon Dev. California, 
2 Cal.4th 342, 372 (1992) ("The covenant requires the party holding 
such [discretionary] power to exercise it 'for any purpose within the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of formation-to 
capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the contract 
interpreted objectively."'). · 
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Based on the agreement at issue in Walt Disney Pictures and 
Television, the court found no evidence that it was "designed to 
thwart Wolf's right to a royalty or that all, or even most, of Disney's 
licensing agreements were structured to require only nonmonetary 
consideration. "217 
C. The Implied Covenant Prohibits a Party from Deliberately 
Frustrating the Expectations of the Counterparty as Expressed in the 
Contract 
But juries and judges are sympathetic to creative talent in cases 
where it is alleged the studio made a fortune and would not share the 
profits, especially when it is established at trial that the studio took 
deliberate steps to ensure participants would not see a dime of 
contingent compensation. In Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, 
Inc. 218 , the film producer Alan Ladd, Jr. filed suit against Warner 
Brothers challenging the studio's practice of "straight lining," where it 
licenses a package of films to cable companies and assigns the same 
value to every film regardless of the film's value to the studio or cable 
company.219 Ladd and Warner Brothers formed a joint venture in 
1979 in which Ladd was given carte-blanche authority to develop and 
produce films as well as control their marketing and distribution.220 
Warner financed the operations but did not have final say on which 
movies were produced. 221 In his fiefdom, Ladd produced a series of 
'popular movies, such as Blade Runner,222 Chariots of Fire,223 and the 
Police Academy224 franchise. When the parties terminated their joint-
venture agreement six years later, the termination agreement 
provided that the studio would continue to pay five percent of gross 
revenues from the licensing of the films produced by Ladd, except for 
Chariots of Fire, for which he would receive two-and-a-half percent.225 
In 1992, Warner did not include Blade Runner in the profit 
participation statement it delivered to Ladd, representing that the 
film did not recoup its costs and was "so far in the red [losing $19.5 
million] it was not worthwhile to issue [profit] statements."226 
217. Id. at 1123. 
218. 184 Cal. App.4th, 1298 (2010). 
219. Id. at 1298. 
220. Id. at 1301. 
221. Id. 
222. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982). 
223. CHARIOTS OF FIRE (Warner Bros. 1981). 
224. POLICE ACADEMY (Warner Bros. 1984). 
225. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1303. 
226. Id. at 1301. 
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Knowing the studio's obligation to act fairly and in good faith, Ladd 
did not dispute the representation. In 2001, however, Ladd 
discovered that Warner was making contingent-compensation 
payments to another investor on Blade Runner, prompting him to 
exercise his right to audit. The audit revealed that the film was 
making money hand over fist. 227 
At issue in Ladd was the practice of "straight-lining," where a 
studio licenses a package of films to cable companies and assigns the 
same value to every film in the package, regardless of each film's 
comparative value. 228 For instance, if a studio licenses a package of 
twenty films to a cable company for $20 million, the studio might 
then allocate $1 million for each film's balance sheet. The $1 million 
is reported, in part, for purposes of making profit-participation 
payments. However, some films in the package might be worth $1 
million or more. The participants in those films would argue that the 
studio deprived them of an accurate accounting by not giving a fair 
allocation to each film based on its relative value as part of the 
package. 229 
Ladd challenged the straight-lining method, arguing it ignored the 
true value of each film and, therefore, deprived him of the share of 
profits he expected to earn in licensing fees. 230 At trial, a Warner 
Brothers executive testified that acting in good faith includes the duty 
to "fairly and accurately allocate licensee fees to each of the films 
based on their comparative value as part of the package. "231 As a 
profit participant, Ladd argued the studio violated the implied 
covenant by assigning the same value to blockbusters as flops, since 
the studio is expected to report a film's revenues truthfully and 
accurately.232 Internally, Warner Brothers evaluated each film's 
227. Id. at 1302. 
228. Id. 
229. See, e.g., id. at 1300 ("The gravamen of Ladd's action against Warner is 
that by allocating the same portion of the licensing fee to every movie in 
a package without regard to the true value of each movie, Warner 
deprived Ladd of a fair allocation of the licensing fees to which Ladd 
was entitled as a profit participant."). 
230. Id. at 1303. ("The problem was that Warner allocated the same 
proportion of the license fee to each title in the package, irrespective of 
the film's letter grade. Simon opined that in treating every movie as 
though it had the same value, "the studio was not doing its expert 
work, as a provider or distributor of content, in weighing the value of 
each of these titles .... "). 
231. Id. at 1307. 
232. Id. at 1306-07. 
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221. Id. 
222. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982). 
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did not dispute the representation. In 2001, however, Ladd 
discovered that Warner was making contingent-compensation 
payments to another investor on Blade Runner, prompting him to 
exercise his right to audit. The audit revealed that the film was 
making money hand over fist. 227 
At issue in Ladd was the practice of "straight-lining," where a 
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to "fairly and accurately allocate licensee fees to each of the films 
based on their comparative value as part of the package. "231 As a 
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227. Id. at 1302. 
228. Id. 
229. See, e.g., id. at 1300 ("The gravamen of Ladd's action against Warner is 
that by allocating the same portion of the licensing fee to every movie in 
a package without regard to the true value of each movie, Warner 
deprived Ladd of a fair allocation of the licensing fees to which Ladd 
was entitled as a profit participant."). 
230. Id. at 1303. ("The problem was that Warner allocated the same 
proportion of the license fee to each title in the package, irrespective of 
the film's letter grade. Simon opined that in treating every movie as 
though it had the same value, "the studio was not doing its expert 
work, as a provider or distributor of content, in weighing the value of 
each of these titles .... "). 
231. Id. at 1307. 
232. Id. at 1306-07. 
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relative value by assigning a grade of A, B, or C, an exercise that 
violates the duty to act in good faith. 233 
Moreover, Ladd alleged that Warner undervalued the package of 
films by $97 million. 234 The jury agreed with Ladd and concluded 
that Warner's improper accounting resulted in an underpayment of 
more than $3 million in contingent compensation.235 On appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed, holding the implied covenant obliged the 
studio to "fairly and accurately allocate license fees to each of the 
films based on their comparative value as part of a package. "236 The 
court also noted the straight-lining method violates the implied 
covenant because bundling deprives the films of individual 
valuation. 237 
When a television program such as Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire? becomes so popular that the program itself is a household 
name, it is hard to believe a studio that claims it failed to earn profits 
sufficient to pay contingent compensation. In July 2010, a federal 
jury found in favor of Celador International, the British production 
company that created the game show, and awarded damages of $260 
million in unpaid licensing fees and $9.2 million in money owed from 
merchandising royalties. 238 The jury also found that Disney breached 
its obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with Celador when it 
took deliberate steps to deprive the creators of their share of 
contingent compensation in connection with Millionaire. 239 In 
September 2010, a federal judge awarded the creators an additional 
$50 million in prejudgment interest.240 
233. Id. at 1307. 
234. Id. at 1303. ("With respect to damages, Simon determined Warner 
should have allocated an additional $97 million in licensing fees to 
Ladd's films."). 
235. Id. at 1298. 
236. Id. at 1300. 
237. Id. ("Therefore, the record supports the jury's determination that 
Warner's straight-lining method of allocating licensing fees to profit 
participants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing."). 
238. Sue Manning, Disney-Celador Lawsuit Verdict: Disney Ordered to Pay 
'Millionaire' Makers $269.2 Million, HUFF. PO$T (Jul. 7, 2010, 5:55 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010 /07 /07 / disneycelador-lawsuit-
ver_n_638518.html ("The jury awarded $260 -million in license fees and 
$9.2 million for merchandising claims, which were made based on $70 
million in sales of a home edition of the game show."). 
239. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 850 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (denying Disney's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
240. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Judge denies Disney's request for new trial in 
'Millionaire' dispute, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, available at 
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The Celador decision stems from the contract Celador entered 
into in 1999 with the ABC television network and Buena Vista 
Television ("BVT")-both of which are Walt Disney companies-to 
develop, produce, and. syndicate the popular game show for broadcast 
in the United States.241 The contract provided that Celador would 
receive 50 percent of the "Defined Contingent Compensation" (i.e., 
net profits) derived from the exploitation of the series by ABC and 
BVT. 242 The Disney companies tapped Valleycrest Productions-
another Disney subsidiary-to handle production duties for 
Millionaire, including the responsibility to license the show to 
broadcasters. 243 
Millionaire, the game show hosted by Regis Philbin, became an 
overnight success, skyrocketing to the top of the Nielsen ratings for 
the most-watched television show in the United States.244 On the 
heels of the show's enormous success, ABC moved to first place in the 
network ratings war. 245 Millionaire has been on the air for longer than 
a decade, the first three years on ABC and since airing multiple days 
per week in syndication. 246 However, according to Celador, the 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2010/12/judge-
denies-disneys-request-for-new-trial-in-millionaire-dispute.html ("[The 
judge] later tacked on $50 million in prejudgment interest to be paid to 
Celador."). 
241. Celador, 347 F. Supp:2d at 850. ("Plaintiffs are the creators and 
executive producers of the television game show, 'Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire[?]' .... Plaintiffs entered into a contract in 1998 with ABC 
and BVT, both subsidiaries of Defendant Walt Disney Co. . . . wherein 
the parties 'agreed to become 50-50 partners with respect to the 
production, distribution and exploitation of the Series in North 
America.'"). 
242. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for certain rights to the concept 
and format of [Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?], ABC and BVT agreed 
to (1) pay Celador fixed compensation and 503 of Defined Contingent 
Compensation derived from the exploitation of the series .... "). 
243. Id. ("After the agreement was entered into, Plaintiffs allege that ABC 
and BVT assigned the production duties of [Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire?] to their fellow subsidiary of Disney, Valley crest Prod. 
Ltd."). 
244. Linda Moss, 'Millionaire' Rained on Cable's May Parade, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jun. 5, 2000, at 30 ("The only one of the four 
broadcast networks to actually see a ratings increase in primetime was 
ABC, with lethal programming weapon Millionaire giving it a whopping 
29 percent bump, to a 9.9 from a 7.7, which drove broadcast's gains."). 
245. Id. 
246. See Edvard Pettersson, Disney seeks reversal of $319 Million 
"Millionaire" Loss, BLOOMBERG (Oct 10, 2012, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/disney-seeks-reversal-of-
319-million-millionaire-loss.html (discussing Celador's contract with 
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relative value by assigning a grade of A, B, or C, an exercise that 
violates the duty to act in good faith. 233 
Moreover, Ladd alleged that Warner undervalued the package of 
films by $97 million. 234 The jury agreed with Ladd and concluded 
that Warner's improper accounting resulted in an underpayment of 
more than $3 million in contingent compensation.235 On appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed, holding the implied covenant obliged the 
studio to "fairly and accurately allocate license fees to each of the 
films based on their comparative value as part of a package. "236 The 
court also noted the straight-lining method violates the implied 
covenant because bundling deprives the films of individual 
valuation.237 
When a television program such as Who Wants to Be a 
Millionaire? becomes so popular that the program itself is a household 
name, it is hard to believe a studio that claims it failed to earn profits 
sufficient to pay contingent compensation. In July 2010, a federal 
jury found in favor of Celador International, the British production 
company that created the game show, and awarded damages of $260 
million in unpaid licensing fees and $9.2 million in money owed from 
merchandising royalties. 238 The jury also found that Disney breached 
its obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with Celador when it 
took deliberate steps to deprive the creators of their share of 
contingent compensation in connection with Millionaire. 239 In 
September 2010, a federal judge awarded the creators an additional 
$50 million in prejudgment interest.240 
233. Id. at 1307. 
234. Id. at 1303. ("With respect to damages, Simon determined Warner 
should have allocated an additional $97 million in licensing fees to 
Ladd's films."). 
235. Id. at 1298. 
236. Id. at 1300. 
237. Id. ("Therefore, the record supports the jury's determination that 
Warner's straight-lining method of allocating licensing fees to profit 
participants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing."). 
238. Sue Manning, Disney-Celador Lawsuit Verdict: Disney Ordered to Pay 
'Millionaire' Makers $269.2 Million, HUFF. POST (Jul. 7, 2010, 5:55 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07 /07 /disneycelador-lawsuit-
ver_n_638518.html ("The jury awarded $260 million in license fees and 
$9.2 million for merchandising claims, which were made based on $70 
million in sales of a home edition of the game show."). 
239. Celador Int'l, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 347 F. Supp.2d 846, 850 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (denying Disney's motion to dismiss the claim for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 
240. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Judge denies Disney's request for new trial in 
'Millionaire' dispute, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, available at 
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heels of the show's enormous success, ABC moved to first place in the 
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per week in syndication. 246 However, according to Celador, the 
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denies-disneys-request-for-new-trial-in-millionaire-dispute.html (" [The 
judge] later tacked on $50 million in prejudgment interest to be paid to 
Celador. "). 
241. Celador, 347 F. Supp:2d at 850. ("Plaintiffs are the creators and 
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244. Linda Moss, 'Millionaire' Rained on Cable's May Parade, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jun. 5, 2000, at 30 ("The only one of the four 
broadcast networks to actually see a ratings increase in primetime was 
ABC, with lethal programming weapon Millionaire giving it a whopping 
29 percent bump, to a 9.9 from a 7.7, which drove broadcast's gains."). 
245. Id. 
246. See Edvard Pettersson, Disney seeks reversal of $319 Million 
"Millionaire" Loss, BLOOMBERG (Oct 10, 2012, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-10/disney-seeks-reversal-of-
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477 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Hit Losers 
accounting statements generated by Disney reported the show did not 
recoup its production costs and was running a loss of $70 million.247 
How can a fifty-percent profit share in a popular television show, 
which generates millions of dollars in revenues for Disney and its 
affiliates, result in zero profits for its British creators? The answer 
lies in the way ABC and BVT orchestrated a series of backchannel 
transactions-without Celador's knowledge-with Disney affiliates to 
shelter revenue earned by the show. For instance, Celador claimed 
that ABC agreed orally to license the broadcast rights in the show 
from Valleycrest for a per-episode fee equal to the amount of 
Valleycrest's production costs on a per-episode basis.248 The 
arrangement effectively eliminated Celador's ability to receive its net-
profits payments, because the amount of contingent compensation 
Celador would receive depended on how much in license fees 
Valley crest collected from broadcasters as well as on Valley crest's 
production costs.249 
According to Celador, the arrangement between the Disney 
affiliates enabled Valleycrest to charge below-market licensing fees 
while having no effect on the profit earned by Disney itself.250 That is 
largely because the contract ,.,entitled Celador to share only in 
Valleycrest's profits from the show-not Disney's. 251 In addition, it is 
customary in the entertainment industry for a production company to 
renegotiate higher license fees for enormously successful shows even 
Disney and providing background and syndication information about 
Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?.) 
247. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at 13, 
Celador, 34 7 F. Supp.2d 846. 
248. Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d at 850 (citing Complaint at , 9) ("As part of 
the agreement with Valleycrest, Plaintiffs claim that ABC agreed orally 
to license the Series for an "imputed per-episode license fee equal to 
Valleycrest 's per-episode production costs."). 
249. Id .. (As a result, the network exhibition of the Series could never reach 
profits after production costs, distribution fees, distribution costs, 
overhead, interest, etc. were deducted from any gross receipts). 
250. Id. at 851 (citing Complaint at , 16) ("Plaintiff alleges that because 
ABC and BVT are required to share the profits derived from the Series 
with Celador, it is in Disney's best interest, as the parent company of 
ABC, BVT and Valleycrest, for the license with ABC to be less than 
the fair market price for the right to license the Series and for 
Valleycrest to inflate its production costs."). 
251. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege, 'Profits from lower production costs and increased 
revenues from the Series, which would have flowed to Celador if paid to 
BVT, remain instead with the Disney empire, in the form of cost 
savings and increased profits to Disney's affiliates."'). 
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though it is not mandated by the agreement. 252 The purposes of the 
self-dealing transactions, according to Celador, were to shelter revenue 
and retain profits within Disney's control.253 
Before the jury verdict, Judge Cooper denied Disney's motions to 
dismiss for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant 
under an exception that allowed Celador to present evidence 
demonstrating the Disney companies "frustrated a benefit of the 
contract," which was the benefit to receive contingent compensation 
from the show.254 The court based its decision to deny Disney's 
motion on evidence that Disney "failed to renegotiate contracts in a 
manner consistent with industry custom, "255 and that, in ·making 
sweetheart licensing deals with affiliates, its agreements were "not fair 
and reasonable. "256 Despite a provision in the contract granting ABC 
and BVT the right to self-deal and requiring Celador to prove that a 
specific deal was unfair, 257 the court acknowledged that there was 
sufficient evidence that this was indeed in the case. 258 In future cases, 
this finding will likely encourage participants to challenge accounting 
statements based on presumptions of fairness and equity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with 
contractual partners does not prohibit a studio from acting in its 
interests under an agreement. Nor do fiduciary duties, which do not 
252. Id. at 850-51 (citing Complaint at , 14) ("Plaintiffs allege that it is the 
custom and practice in the entertainment industry to renegotiate higher 
licensing fees when a show is highly successful."). 
253. Id. (citing Complaint at , 16). 
254. Id. at 853. 
255. Id. at 852. 
256. Id. 
257. Silberfeld & Conn, supra note 38, at 40 (citing Trial Exhibit No. 33, 
Celador, 347 F. Supp. 2d. 846) (provision reads that "Owner 
acknowledges and agrees that any agreement or other arrangement by 
ABC /BVT with an Affiliate or Related Party shall be conclusively 
presumed to be fair, reasonable and unobjectionable unless Owner shall 
establish that such agreement or other arrangement is on non-unique 
financial terms which, taken as a whole, are materially less favorable 
economically to ABC /BVT . . . Owner further agrees that ... Owner's 
sole and exclusive remedy [to unfavorable transactions] shall be the right 
to receive an adjusted accounting statement, including any additional 
payments that may be required."). 
258. Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d at 856 ("[I]t can be inferred that Defendants 
never intended to seek competitive bids or profitable licensing fees. 
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated the basis for their allegations on 
information and be~ief. "). 
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accounting statements generated by Disney reported the show did not 
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Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?.) 
247. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law at 13, 
Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d 846. 
248. Celador, 347 F. Supp.2d at 850 (citing Complaint at , 9) ("As part of 
the agreement with Valleycrest, Plaintiffs claim that ABC agreed orally 
to license the Series for an "imputed per-episode license fee equal to 
Valleycrest 's per-episode production costs.''). 
249. Id .. (As a result, the network exhibition of the Series could never reach 
profits after production costs, distribution fees, distribution costs, 
overhead, interest, etc. were deducted from any gross receipts). 
250. Id. at 851 (citing Complaint at , 16) ("Plaintiff alleges that because 
ABC and BVT are required to share the profits derived from the Series 
with Celador, it is in Disney's best interest, as the parent company of 
ABC, BVT and Valleycrest, for the license with ABC to be less than 
the fair market price for the right to license the Series and for 
Valleycrest to inflate its production costs."). 
251. Id. ("Plaintiffs allege, 'Profits from lower production costs and increased 
revenues from the Series, which would have flowed to Celador if paid to 
BVT, remain instead with the Disney empire, in the form of cost 
savings and increased profits to Disney's affiliates."'). 
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though it is not mandated by the agreement. 252 The purposes of the 
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arise in profit-participation agreements unless the studio-participant 
relationship parallels that of partners in a partnership-an 
arrangement that is seldom the case. So the profit participant is still 
at risk of being deprived of its promised share of contingent 
compensation when dealing with studios-unless the participant 
himself has the financial resources to challenge a suspicious 
participation statement. In these scenarios, the participant becomes a 
sympathetic character, someone who has little option but to repose 
trust and confidence in the studio to account fully and accurately his 
share of net profits in a successful project, but who knows the studio 
will fight him tooth and nail over every penny of supplemental 
income. 
Despite the features of the studio-participant relationship, it is 
highly unlikely that a court will be persuaded to go against the Wolf 
v. Superior Court 259 holding and declare that a fiduciary relationship 
exists. Its characteristics are similar to those found in relationships 
between manufacturers and distributors, those at the heart of 
commercial industries.26° For instance, the participant is akin to a 
manufacturer of intellectual property, a product that is distributed by 
the studio throughout the world as best it can. The parties share the 
proceeds of their joint efforts as previously bargained. If the 
distributor fails to pay money owed under the contract, it creates a 
debt obligation. However, a debt is not a trust and it does not create 
a fiduciary relationship-regardless of whether the debt is of a certain 
amount or is contingent on future events whose certainty is unknown. 
261 It is also true that if courts recognize fiduciary duties that studios 
will respond by disclaiming fiduciary duties. 
Yet, courts should not dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims too 
quickly. The Wolf decision left open the possibility for a fiduciary 
relationship to be recognized on factors other than the right to receive 
contingent compensation-and the participant should be given an 
opportunity to present evidence at trial demonstrating his additional 
responsibilities on the project. If the studio and production company 
enter into an agreement that not only has a profit-sharing mechanism 
but also has other co-ownership features-Le., each of them finances 
production, engages his own distributors, works together side by side, 
and brings in revenues that it accounts to its contractual partner-
there is a situation where the parties formed a partnership by 
259. 107 Cal. App.4th 25 (2003} (holding that the right to receive contingent 
compensation in the exclusive control of one party does not, by itself, 
make the party a fiduciary for purposes of making payments). 
260. See MOORE, supra note 7, at 154-55. 
261. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App.2d 323, 333, 227 P.2d 484, 490 
(1951) ("A debt is not a trust and there is not a fiduciary relation 
between debtor and creditor as such."). 
480 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. 2 · 2013 
Hit Losers 
implication, even if they did not intend to or explicitly· disclaimed the 
creation of one. 
If courts find the studio-participant relationship to be fiduciary in 
character, the participant would be afforded substantially more 
bargaining power in its negotiations. Reducing the disparity· of 
bargaining power might encourage more transparent dealings and 
discourage studios from manipulating accounting statements for their 
financial benefit. For vertically integrated companies, the prospect of 
·owing punitive damages in addition to ordinary damages might 
encourage them to seek higher bids to license a successful television 
series from unaffiliated companies. 
Juries have found that a concerted effort to deprive participants 
their share of net profits is acting in bad faith-and the studios' 
actions in Ladd v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.262 and Celador 
International, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Compan'!}263 were condemned-
resulting in significant rewards in damages. Those decisions and 
findings suggest an explicit right to contingent compensation includes 
an implied right to reasonable access to information and a reasonably 
accurate accounting of revenues. Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict 
outcomes based on these factors in cases where the duty to act in 
good faith is involved since they depend significantly on the facts of a 
given dispute. Determining a party has not acted in good faith 
depends on the size, facts, and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction and the particular risks and expectations of the parties 
when they entered into the agreement. In addition, since this area of 
iaw is so fact-specific it may be hard to render consistent applications 
to similar cases, as fact finders may substitute their own intuition of 
what constitutes reasonable expectations under the circumstances. 
To illustrate, the contract in Ladd did not state how the studio 
would allocate fees earned by licensing a package of films. 264 Ladd 
argued for an allocation to take into account the relative values of the 
individual films, whereas Warner Brothers believed it could be 
allocated without comparing each film's value.265 Without a 
settlement, a fact finder had to make the determination. The jury 
concluded the studio's method of allocation was unfair,266 but it is also 
possible for a different jury to have found that what the studio did 
was neither unreasonable according to industry standards nor was it a 
subjective act of bad faith to frustrate the participant's right to 
receive contingent compensation. 
262. 184 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2010). 
263. 347 F. Supp. 2d 846 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 
264. Ladd, 184 Cal. App.4th at 1298. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 1300. 
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would allocate fees earned by licensing a package of films. 264 Ladd 
argued for an allocation to take into account the relative values of the 
individual films, whereas Warner Brothers believed it could be 
allocated without comparing each film's value.265 Without a 
settlement, a fact finder had to make the determination. The jury 
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possible for a different jury to have found that what the studio did 
was neither unreasonable according to industry standards nor was it a 
subjective act of bad faith to frustrate the participant's right to 
receive contingent compensation. 
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The facts do not lead to a predictable outcome because the 
implied terms of the contract do not state how to perform in a specific 
situation. One party can take advantage of the contractual silence to 
thwart the right of the counterparty to receive what is provided for 
expressly in the contract. Fact finders can review the same evidence 
and come to different legal conclusions. As a result, bringing a net 
profits case into a courtroom means the parties are entering into a 
high stakes affair where millions of dollars are on the line and an 
interpretation of the relevant legal doctrine does not lead to 
predictable outcomes. The question for both creative talent and 
studios is whether they are willing to roll the dice. 
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RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF 
lNTRABRAND COMPETITION IN HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: THE 
PROBLEM WITH LARGE RETAILORS & 
VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS 
By Kyle Colonna* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The current antitrust regime places a premium on interbrand 
competition. 1 Interbrand competition is competition between brands,2 
such as Apple competing with Google in the smartphone market.3 
Intrabrand competition is, on the other hand, competition within a 
brand.4 For example, intrabrand competition occurs when Apple 
stores compete with each other or when Apple stores compete with 
Wal-Mart stores that sell Apple products.5 In many instances, the 
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Carlo Luis Rodes, Note, Giving Teeth to Sherman Act Enforcement in 
tthe Intrabrand Context: Weaning Courts off Their Interbrand Addiction 
Post-Sylvania, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 957, 966 (2008-2009) (arguing 
for stricter judicial scrutiny of anti-competitive behavior in the 
intrabrand context). 
Cont'l T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n.19 (1977) (addressing 
whether a television manufacturer could place territorial restrictions on 
its franchised retailers under section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
See Harry McCracken, iPhone v. Android: The Smart Phone Wars Rage 
On, TIME (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/ 
0,8599,2023452,00.html (noting "the battle between the iPhone and 
Android is in its early stages"). 
Cont'l T. V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 ("Intrabrand competition is the 
competition between the distributors - wholesale or retail - of the 
product of a particular manufacturer."). 
The key to determining intrabrand competition is correctly defining the 
product or service the party provides. For instance, an Apple Store that 
sells iPhones and a nearby cellular service provider that sells iPhones is 
intrabrand competition. The same label, i.e., Apple, is being sold at 
different distributors. At the interbrand level, however, Apple and 
Google compete in the smart phone market. The cellular service 
provider is a retailer of a service. So it competes interbrand against 
other cellular service providers. 
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